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The Public Trust in Data
(forthcoming, Georgetown Law Journal -- (2021))
Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
Personal data is no longer just personal. Social networks and pervasive
environmental surveillance via cellphones and the ‘internet of things’ extract
minute-by-minute details of our behavior and cognition. This information
accumulates into a valuable asset. It then circulates among data brokers, targeted
advertisers, political campaigns, and even foreign states as fuel for predictive
interventions. Rich gains flow to firms well positioned to leverage these new
information aggregates. The privacy losses, economic exploitation, structural
inequalities, and democratic backsliding produced by personal data economies,
however, fall upon society at large.
This Article proposes a novel regulatory intervention to mitigate the harms from
transforming personal data into an asset. States and municipalities should create
“public trusts” as governance vehicles for their residents’ locational and personal
data. An asset in “public trust” is owed and managed by the state. The state can
permit its use, and even allow limited alienation, if doing so benefits a broad public
rather than a handful of firms. Unique among the legal interventions proposed for
new data economies, a public trust for data allows a democratic polity to durably
commit to public-regarding management of its informational resources, coupled to
judicially enforceable limits on private exploitation and public allocation
decisions. The public trust itself is a common-law doctrine of ancient roots. It was
revived in the Progressive Era as an instrument to protect public assets against
private exploitation. Both federal and state courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, have since endorsed a variety of doctrinal formulations. The result today is
a rich repertoire of rules and remedies for the management of common property.
Personal data, usefully, has many similarities to assets long managed by public
trust. And familiar justifications for creation of a public trust logically extend to
personal data. Indeed, municipalities in the United States, Europe, and Canada
have started to experiment with limited forms of a public trust in data. Generalizing
from those experiences, this Article offers a ‘proof of concept’ for how personal
data economies can be leashed through the public trust.

*

Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Lee Fennell,
Sonia Kaytal, Aniel Kovvali, Randy Picker, and Eric Posner—as well participants in Chicago’s Works-in-Progress
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Introduction
Personal data is no longer just personal. Social networks, websites, cellphones, and an
‘internet of things’ extract minute-by-minute details of our behavior and cognition. These are
warehoused and circulated among data brokers, advertisers, political campaigns, and even foreign
states. As it moves, this data accumulates into a valuable asset. It feeds the machine-learning
algorithms that allow Amazon to predict purchases, Netflix to estimate views, and governments to
anticipate crime. Its predictions drive interventions such as targeted advertising, prompts to digest
political disinformation, or decisions to arrest suspects, bail denial to some, and keep yet more
behind bars. Rich rewards flow to firms well positioned to leverage these new information
aggregates. Dominant social platforms in the United States today have a market capitalization of
more than four trillion dollars.1 But these new affordances come with a price. The personal data
economy’s toll is felt in lost privacy, economic vulnerability for workers, swelling structural
inequality at the social level, and a drip-fed corrosion of democratic values. The solutions proposed
to ameliorate these harms include the creation of individual property rights to personal data and
the reinvigoration of antitrust law. But all solutions to date are necessarily partial in ambition.
None decisively rewire the growing concentration of wealth and income in dominant firms. None
clearly redound to the benefit of all users creating value at the front end.
This Article proposes a novel regulatory intervention to mitigate the harms of personal data
economies and to advance the public’s privacy, equality, and economic interests. States and
municipalities, it contends, should create “public trusts” as governance vehicles for their residents’
personal data. An asset in “public trust” is owed and managed by the state subject to judicially
enforceable controls on use and alienation. The asset can both be used by the general public or
made available for controlled commercial exploitation. Either way, it remains subject to the state’s
supervening obligation “to protect the people's common heritage”2 and to ensure it remains in good
condition.3 Uses that yield concentrated returns to a small coterie of individuals or firms are
disfavored.4 When created by legislation or state constitutional provision, a public trust provides a
unified vehicle for democratic decision-making over common resources that simultaneously
addresses both the risks of private and public abuse. It can also be coupled to judicial enforcement,
either by a trustee or a lawyer for the state, to ensure that democratic decisions are durable. While
1

Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms: Final Report, U. Chi. Booth Sch. Bus., at 7 (2019),
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms–––committee-report–––stiglercenter.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YYG-PS9C] [hereinafter Stigler Committee Final Report].
2
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (1983).
3
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471, 477 (1970) (enumerating specific limits in the use of a public trust asset). Sax’s article is widely
recognized as marking a sea-change in scholarly understandings of the public trust doctrine. “Until it was revived
and re-invented by Sax, the doctrine held that some resources, particularly lands beneath navigable waters or washed
by the tides, are either inherently the property of the public at large, or are at least subject to a kind of inherent
easement for certain public purposes.” Carol Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q.
351, 352 (1998) [hereinafter “Rose, Idea of the Public Trust”]. It became instead “a vehicle for insisting that public
bodies pay attention to--and adequately vindicate--the changing public interest in diffuse resources.” Id. at 355.
4
Erin Ryan, A Short History of the Public Trust Doctrine and Its Intersection with Private Water Law, 38 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 135, 161 (2020) (“The public trust's doctrinal infrastructure shows that it doesn't just protect the public
nature of these common resources--it also assigns responsibility for their protection--specifically, to the
government.”).
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discrete pieces of regulation can be enacted outside the public trust framework, the latter has the
advantage of simultaneously creating remedies for private and public abuse, and doing so in a
durable fashion.
A public trust for data, I propose, might cover information generated by locational apps,
sensing devices, or geotagged social-media platforms within a jurisdiction. That data would not
need to be maintained within the jurisdiction or held in government databases. It would, however,
be subject to that jurisdiction’s regulation. The ensuing trust could permit commercial use on the
payment of a user fee, which would then be used for the benefit of the population creating the data.
The trust could forbid certain uses of the data—such as the use of photographic images to train
facial recognition instruments. And the trust could impose obligations to create epistemic public
goods with the data: For example, locational data could be mined for insight for epidemiological
purposes against contagious diseases. Or it could be used to improve access for those with
disabilities. Finally, public use of data subject to the trust would be constrained by limits designed
to maintain individual privacy and public trust—much as data collected by social security and tax
authorities is constrained.
A public trust in data (of a sort) has already been implemented by cities around the world:
•

The Spanish city Barcelona uses a platform called “Decidem” as a vehicle for the
governance of personal data.5 For example, a company wishing to operate a service that
creates and uses personal locational data—say, a bike sharing firm—must agree to give
their data to Decidem, where its uses will be subject to public debate and decision.6
Decidem is being adopted by other European cities such as Amsterdam. It aims to create
“new types of local data commons where people are empowered to collect and share data
in response to local challenges.”7

•

Since January 2019, New York City has mandated that ride-sharing companies such as
Uber and Lyft disclose operational data on “the date, time, and location of pickups and
drop-offs (at least down to the intersection), the vehicle’s license number, the trip mileage,
itemized trip fare, route (including whether the vehicle entered traffic-choked Midtown),
and how much the driver was paid” as a condition of operating.8 By bringing this data into
public hands, New York City takes a crucial step toward making locational data a matter
of public trust.

•

On the other side of the country, the Silicon Valley Data Trust brings together streams of
information from benefits agencies, child protection bureaus, schools, and education
technology companies to create a “well-managed regional data trust [and] provide a

5

Amy Lewin, Barcelona’s Robin Hood of Data, SIFTED (Nov. 16, 2018), https://sifted.eu/articles/barcelonas-robinhood-of-data-francesca-bria/
6
Id.
7
Theo Bass and Rosalyn Old, Common Knowledge: Citizen-led Governance for Better Cities 24 (Jan. 2020),
https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/DECODE_Common_Knowledge_Citizen_led_data_governance_for_better_ci
ties_Jan_2020.pdf/.
8
Aarian Marshall, NYC Now Knows More Than Ever About Your Uber and Lyft Trips, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/nyc-uber-lyft-ride-hail-data/ [hereinafter “Marshall, NYC”].
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comprehensive understanding of factors contributing to student failure and success.”9
Hosted by Santa Clara County, the Data Trust’s primary purpose is to allow research to
“improve service and educational outcomes, especially for children of poverty.”10 It thus
allows for the production of a public good that would otherwise be untapped.
All these initiatives blend together private and public data, impose democratically determined use
rules, and vindicate policy goals that would otherwise go unrealized. They are all ways to ensure,
as Rana Foroohar of the Financial Times has put it, that firms are not “mining our biggest natural
resource for free.”11
This Article extends these emergent models of personal-data governance by a public body.
It offers a ‘proof of concept’ for a new legal strategy, albeit one with deep common-law roots,
tailored to a novel resource. The asset I’m concerned with here is “personal data.” (By this, I mean
information that “singles out a specific individual from others,” and also “when specific
identification is “ possible, [if] not a significantly probable event.”12) The paper’s core intuition is
to view this data not as an aspect of individual action or a particular firm’s ingenuity, but as a
shared asset—one realized through the entangled social interactions of the many, and one
vindicated by recognizing the many rather than the one as pivotal. In this regard, its motivating
impulse is Karl Polanyi’s injunction to “transcend the self-regulating market by consciously
subordinating it to a democratic society.”13
Why look to the ancient common law for a solution to a distinctively modern problem of
personal data?14 Familiarity no doubt eases the transitional costs of adoption. But more
importantly, the public trust is already well suited to address the harms flowing from personal data
economies. The doctrine was first developed in Roman and English common law as a governance
tool for common resources such as fisheries and shared navigable waters. In the late nineteenth
century, the U.S. Supreme Court embraced it as an instrument for managing common assets at risk
of abuse by powerful interest groups. The Court’s analysis suggested that such an asset should
benefit a broad public, not just powerful firms. It also identified a risk that state bodies such as
legislatures might be captured, and thus dispose of the asset in ways that contravened the public
interest.15 To prevent this, a Progressive Era public trust came with a thicket of substantive and
procedural safeguards. In this way, the public trust took flight in America’s first gilded age of
inequality and corporate dominance as a doctrinal shield for the public against the abuse of
9

The Silicon Valley Data Trust (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.svrdt.org/.
Id.
11
RANA FOROOHAR, DON’T BE EVIL: THE CASE AGAINST BIG TECH 275 (2019).
12
Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and A New Concept of Personally Identifiable
Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1877-78 (2011); cf. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 8 (2015) (describing privacy as “the ability to control information about
yourself, which may captured many, but not most, use of that term”).
13
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 242
(2001).
14
Even more familiar applications of public trust principles are subject to criticism. For a cogent argument on
democracy-related grounds, William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine As an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 693, 696 (2012) (noting the criticism that “courts have neither the legal authority nor the expertise:” to
implement public trusts).
15
Cf. Sax, supra note 3, at 521 (“The ‘public trust’ doctrine has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no
more—and no less—than a name given by courts to their concerns about the democratic process.”).
10
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concentrated private power. It is an animating logic that can be transposed seamlessly to the present
day.
The public trust is also a malleable doctrinal tool. State courts have adapted and refined the
public trust doctrine to fit widely divergent asset types.16 It has been used to cover oyster beds,
navigation rights in lakes and rivers, parklands, groundwater, and the littoral beaches of the
Atlantic seaboard.17 The environmental resources to which the doctrine is canonically applied are
natural rather than man-made. But still, they have strikingly similarities to personal data. Some
were created through the contributions of many; most are valuable when aggregated rather than
when divided; they have a borderless, open-ended quality; and they present the need to balance
both public and private uses. Personal data, in short, is well-suited to the public trust doctrine in
terms of its form. For each kind of asset falling within the doctrine, judges have fashioned a distinct
set of governance rules. These can include easements for the general public, limitations on
alienation and uses, even something akin to administrative law’s ‘hard look’ doctrine.18 This sheer
range of doctrinal ingenuity reflects common-law judges’ ingenious efforts to balance diverse
exploitation and spoilage risks. Today, it means that the public trust doctrine offers a rich repertoire
of doctrinal tools for managing personal data as a common asset.
The most promising venue for the creation of a public trust is municipal government.
Indeed, this is where it’s already happening. Locational data of the sort collected by Decidem
provides the most ready target for a public trust. Cities could also extend pubic trusts in data to
protect the personal data their residents generate on platform economies such as Facebook, Twitter,
and Google, and on the internet more generally. Regulation by even a small number of large
American cities has the potential to force significant, public-regarding changes to personal data
economies.19 Once established by a legislature or state constitution-making body, a public trust
also has democratic credentials: It enables ongoing public deliberation and determination of how
a common asset is employed, with the courts working as a back-stop against interest-group capture.
It could be used to stymie the harmful uses of personal, while promoting public-regarding ones,
and preventing the concentration of profits in a small number of firms to the exclusion of those
who create data in the first instance. The result would be a more democratic and less regressive
data-based economy, one that was less inimical to interests in privacy and economic desert.
The argument has four elements. Part I summarizes the basic economic logic of
commodification, circulation, and use animating personal-data economies. To establish the need
for a new regulatory intervention, Part II documents, and then supplements, a catalog of normative
objections to personal data economies. The leading proposed responses—including the creation of
a private property interest in data and the aggressive application of structural antitrust remedies—
are considered in Part III. While valuable, none of these interventions covers the waterfront of
harms documented in Part II. The fourth, most important, part of the Article proposes and defends
the possibility of a public trust in data as a generally applicable vehicle for addressing harms of
new personal data economies.

16

Id. at 509 (describing the doctrine as a “technique”).
See infra Part IV.A.
18
See infra Part IV.B.
19
See infra Part IV.C.
17
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I.

Our Data and the Economies it Makes

The case for a public trust in personal data stands upon first a factual and then a normative
foundation. This Part takes up the factual part of that case by setting out how personal data becomes
an asset. It historicizes the emergence of data economies, and outlines in more detail three circuits
through which personal data passes to accrue commercial value.
A.

The Pre-History of our Data Economies

Economies of personal data are more than a century old.20 In 1903, the New York Life
insurance company adopted the nation’s first insurance rating system drawing on demographic
and health data.21 Two years later, Pennsylvania enacted a law requiring the collection of vital
statistics, greatly expanding the empirical scope for actuarial calculation.22 Midcentury advances
in computing stimulated new data uses. In 1953, the AT&T Company purchased IBM’s Univac
system to manage its 100,000-person Bell System Employee Attitude Survey,23 while the Nielsen
Company started gathering data on what TV American families watched.24 In 1959, the
Simulmatics corporation broke new ground. It sieved polling data through a scrim of midcentury
behavioral science to create predictions for sale to advertising agencies and political campaigns.25
By 1972, the National Academy of Sciences would document fifty-five large “computing
organizations” collecting personal data. These ranged from the Bank of America and the Mutual
of Omaha to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Church of the Latter-Day Saints.26
Yet the Academy found “no radical departures” from pre-computer information practices.27 Data
may have been everywhere, but it was also almost always economically sterile.
Had technological and organizational constraints held fast, the best governance regime for
personal data would be a question of only passing interest. But the 1980s saw great advances in
machine-learning algorithms for discerning relationships and making predictions using large
datasets.28 Then in the 1990s, large corporations found themselves accumulating “tremendous”
20

The creation of “data doubles” by “states, corporations, and voluntary organizations” to further a range of
“governing ambitions” dates back to the post-Civil War era. Dan Bouk, The History and Personal Economy of
Personal Data over the Last Two Centuries in Three Acts, 32 OSIRIS 85, 89 (2017); see also JAMES C. SCOTT,
SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2 (1992)
(describing aspiration to render governed populations “legible”).
21
JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 422 (1986); see also Bouk, supra note 20, at 97 (“By making people into ‘statistical individuals’ it became
possible to sort them according to the futures the statistics predicted for them.”).
22
By 1929, all but two states, South Dakota and Texas, had followed suit. COLIN KOOPMAN, HOW WE BECAME OUR
DATA 47-48 (2019).
23
Frederick F. Stephan et al., The machine revolution in the processing of data, 21 PUB. OP. Q. 410, 411 (1957).
24
Bouk, supra note 20, at 102.
25
JILL LEPORE, IF THEN: HOW THE SIMULMATICS CORPORATION INVENTED THE FUTURE (2020).
26
SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 246 (2018).
27
Id. But see Rob Lucas, The Surveillance Machine, 121 NEW LEFT REV. 132, 141 (2020) (describing collection
activities of TRW corporation during the 1970s).
28
ETHEM ALPAYIN, MACHINE LEARNING 28 (2016) (describing the emergence of machine learning alongside “the
capacity to build parallel hardware containing thousands of processors”); MELANIE MITCHELL, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE FOR THINKING HUMANS 39-40 (2019) (identifying 1980s as the first majority advance of
artificial intelligence. A seminal paper describing the backpropagation method used in neural networks was
published in 1986. See David E. Rumelhart, Geoffrey E. Hinton & Ronald J. Williams, Learning representations by
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amounts of data, often across disparate and irreconcilable databases.29 In response, techniques of
“data warehousing” in ever “more comprehensive database[s]” emerged.30 Improvements in
computing power captured in Moore’s famous law, the commodification of cheap data storage,
and the creation of new data-flows cracked commercial frontiers.31 And then, in the 2010s,
improvements in the processing of natural-language corpuses opened a new, yet larger realm of
speech and internet interaction for analysis and enclosure.32
There are data aplenty to analyze now. A 2003 study reported that whereas humanity had
accumulated about 12 exabytes of data before the commodification of computers, in 2003 alone
five exobytes were created.33 Some of the first commercial surveillance tools, such as IBM’s
EasiOrder and Firefly Network’s “intelligent agent” software, emerged just as firms were
grappling with the problem of how to exploit this new resource.34 The upward arc of data
production continues. Data generated by the Internet is predicted to reach some 3.3 zetabytes in
2021.35 The Internet facilitates, while being enabled by, personal data economies. The more it is
used, the more data is produced about its users’ habits, preferences, and behaviors—and the more
apps and services can be built.36 There is also an ongoing dispersion of sensors into cellphones,
vehicles, appliances, and physical infrastructure—the so-called internet of things—that will make
the familiar internet but one tributary of an increasingly engorged “exaflood” of data.37
The interaction between new machine-learning tools and this exaflood is reworking the
economy—from manufacturing to logistics to retail to human resources to marketing. Many of the
ensuing circuits of acquisition, processing, and use concern personal data. And the line between
personal data economies and other data economies can be fuzzy. Financial institutions, for
example, use machine-learning tools to conduct algorithmic trading instruments and manage
compliance with capitalization regulations.38 At the same time, many of the same institutions also
use the same tools to assign credit risk and to identify fraudulent activity by employees, perhaps
using the same data.39
Upon this fertile ground, data is reimagined as something that is not barren or static.
Instead, it is “a raw material of business” and “a new form of value.”40 It is, in short, an asset—
back-propagating errors, 323 NATURE 533 (1986); see also James Somers, Is AI Riding a One –Trick Pony?, 120
MIT TECH. REV. 29, 31 (2017) (explaining the historical emergence of contemporary forms of machine learning).
29
JOHN D. KELLEHER AND BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 8 (2018).
30
Id. at 8-9.
31
Id. at 30-31.
32
NICK POLSON AND JAMES SCOTT, AIQ: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WORKS AND HOW WE CAN HARNESS ITS
POWER FOR A BETTER WORLD 130-32 (2018).
33
LUCIANO FLORIDI, INFORMATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 6 (2010).
34
Sarah Myers West, Data capitalism: Redefining the logics of surveillance and privacy, 58 BUS. & SOC. 20, 26
(2019).
35
CARL BENEDIKT FREY, THE TECHNOLOGY TRAP: CAPITAL, LABOR, AND POWER IN THE AGE OF AUTOMATION 30304 (2019). A zettabyte is 2 to the 70th power bytes.
36
Id. at 304.
37
FLORIDI, supra note 33, at 6.
38
Larry D. Wall, Some financial regulatory implications of artificial intelligence, 100 J. ECON. & BUS. 55, 56-61
(2018).
39
Id.
40
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE
LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 5 (2013).
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even if it directly touches on, or indirectly could be used to reveal, information most people would
consider properly subject their own exclusive control.
B.

Three Contemporary Economies of Personal Data

Personal data can create economic rent in many ways. This section identifies three of the
most important means by which such data circulates and accrues value. All three domains share
the same three-step sequential logic of “dragnets, scores, and interventions.”41 First comes
sweeping collection of data regardless of a firm’s “imaginative reach or analytic grasp,” in the
hope it will “eventually be useful.”42 The second step involves nesting data within a classification
system. Through the extraction of standardized “features,”43 classification makes available
“various scoring, grading, and ranking methods.”44 In the final step, data is treated as an asset to
be refined to fit the needs of advertisers and others.45 This is the point at which “data rents,” or
“revenues that can be derive from ownership and control rights over personal data (as an asset)”
are derived.46
The combination of dragnets, scoring, and interventions characterizes various data
economies. For present purposes, the most important of these are platforms economies such as
Facebook and Google; the business-facing clearing houses called data brokerages; and an
emerging economy of sensing nets—spatially distributed devices gathering data on individuals’
behavior. These three nodes do not exhaust contemporary personal data economies. But they are
the most important. As such, their workings bear directly on the question of appropriate
governance regime for personal data.
1.

Platforms Economies

A platform is a model for organizing transactions in the data economy. Platforms use
“technical protocols and centralized control to define networked spaces in which users can conduct
a heterogeneous array of activities.”47 A platform can perform several different functions. It can
41

Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 9, 13 (2017).
Id.
43
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 700–01 (2017) (describing feature selection).
44
Fourcade and Healy, supra note 41, at 14. Features and classificatory systems can be opaque and, for all practical
purposes, impenetrable to human understanding. Machine learning in particular can entail a transformation of data
through analytic tools that cannot be reproduced in a form comprehensible to a human. Jenna Burrell, How the
machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC. 1, 10 (2016).
Nevertheless, the classification system’s results can have commercial value.
45
Thomas Beauvisage and Kevin Meller, Datasets: Assetizing and Marketing Personal Data, in TURNING THINGS
INTO ASSETS (2020) (draft at 9).
46
Kean Birch, Margaret Chiappetta, and Anna Artyushina, The problem of innovation in technoscientific capitalism:
data rentiership and the policy implications of turning personal digital data into a private asset, 41 POL. STUD. 468,
475 (2020); see also Paul Langley and Andrew Leyshon, Platform capitalism: the intermediation and capitalisation
of digital economic circulation, 3 FIN. & SOC. 11, 13 (2017) ( “[T]he revenues prescribed by the platform business
model amount to the extraction of ‘rents’ from circulations and associated data trails.”).
47
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 41
(2019). Another definition of a “platform” is “a discrete and dynamic arrangement defined by a particular
combination of socio-technical and capitalist business practices.” Langley & Leyshon, supra note 46, at 14.
42
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“replace” and “rematerialize” a market—think Amazon, Uber, or AirBnB.48 Often, a platform
creates two connected markets: one facing consumers from whom data is extracted, and the other
facing other businesses that purchase either the data or a good into which the value of acquired
data is impounded (e.g., advertising slots). On the consumer-facing side, a platform can be a
substitute for social and cultural connectivity. Or it can become the democratic public sphere. On
the business-to-business side, a platform’s data can help to target messaging and products; to
manage and control behavior (e.g., worker productivity); to model probabilities; or to grow the
value of other physical assets (e.g., by tailoring their deployment to the emergence of new
consumer demands).49
Leading platforms interact with staggering numbers of individuals. Because it is the largest
such platform, Facebook serves as a useful example. Starting in 2004 at Harvard, Facebook
“leapfrogged from campus to campus,” engorging itself along the way.50 As it grew, its allure
remained the sentimental leveraging of “the need to see what old friends or family were up to
without the burden of talking to them.”51 In return for this connectivity, users “hand[ed] over a
treasure trove of detailed demographic data.”52 This data could be used to target advertisements,
which generate the overwhelming share of platform revenues. In its 2019 regulatory filings,
Facebook reported having some 2.6 billion users.53 Two-third of Americans use Facebook every
day.54 This creates a surge of detailed data on items, including “the amount of time you hover your
mouse over a particular button and the number of days an item sits in your shopping basket, to
every location you've visited with your phone and how you psychologically react to different posts
and words.”55 Yet in Facebook’s “data-for-payment” model, consumers may or may not
understand the extent to which they are paying for a service through their disclosures of their own
(and perhaps also others’) personal data.56
In addition to the data acquired through user interactions on the social network, Facebook
also derives user and nonuser information from the millions of independent websites and apps
integrating Facebook's Like button.57 “Facebook uses plug-ins to track users’ browsing histories
when they visit third-party websites, and then compiles these browsing histories into personal
48
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profiles which are sold to advertisers to generate revenue.”58 When installed on an Android mobile
phone, Facebook’s app also captures call history and messaging activity.59 All this data helps
Facebook sell “impression-targeted ads” and “action-based ads.”60 And there is no opt-out. For its
first six years, user surveillance was not among Facebook’s mandatory terms. But since an initial
public offering, user surveillance has been mandatory61 and legally largely unconstrainted.62
The collection of personal data as a collateral, often unwitting, side-effect of platform use
is central to the business model of other platforms. Take Google. Every use of Google Maps or
Search “saves certain information about a user’s activity” for the company.63 As a result, Google’s
AdWords, which appear as text alongside search results, are “wildly successful as a means for
monetizing the company’s search business.”64 More than four-fifths of Alphabet’s revenue derives
from the sale of advertisements targeted using this data.65
A novel platform economy with profound and unexplored ramifications is the consumer
genomics market. This market did not exist before the early 2000s.66 Once the human genome had
been sequenced (in 2003), advances in sequencing tools reduced costs to the point where it had
become a multibillion-dollar consumer industry by the mid-2010s.67 Like social media networks
and search, consumer genomics is a two-sided market. It serves both individuals seeking genetic
information and also pharmaceutical firms and research laboratories seeking data stocks.68 With
rare exceptions, genomic data from a single individual is not particularly valuable. Hundreds or
thousands of samples are required for effective medical exploitation.69 Genetic datasets, however,
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fall outside the 1996 Health Portability Accountability Act, and other regulatory regimes.70 Its
commercial sale, purchase, and use is therefore largely unregulated.71
2.

Data Brokers

If social media and search engines are the store front of the personal data economy, databrokers are its back office. Data brokers engage in “information arbitrage” by “buying,
repackaging, and selling consumer data across various markets.”72 They help create telemarketing
lists, aid debt collectors, screen employees, and select targets for credit offers.73 In 2017, the databroker Axiom offered to sell up to three thousand attributes on each of the seven hundred million
individuals in their records; in 2018, it could offer up to ten thousand items on some 2.5 billion
people.74 These numbers are likely bigger now.
The data brokerage industry is opaque.75 In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission
promulgated a much-remarked report listing nine firms.76 In May 2018, Vermont enacted
legislation requiring entities collecting third-party data for commercial purposes to register.77 More
than 120 did. These ranged from long-established credit reporting agencies such as Experian and
Axcion to novel online search engines such as Spokeo, and smaller niche actors catering to
landlords and insurance companies.78 Some are behemoths. In 2018, Axcion reported operating
revenues of $917 million.79 And the Vermont registry is incomplete. It excluded companies that
exploit or trade data related to their own customers, including platforms such as Facebook and
70
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search engines such as Google.80 Its 120 registered firms are only a “fraction” of the broader set
of back-end processors and vendors of personal data.81 Over time, the data brokerage industry has
had “movements of consolidation” resulting in “large multi-purpose data brokers.”82 But a recent
estimate still counts between 2,500 and 4,000 data-brokering firms in the United States.83
3.

Sensing Nets

A third personal data economy involves the collection, classification, and application of
digital traces produced by physical devices. Small, low-cost, wireless, and energy-efficient sensors
can be installed in a range of objects to generate geolocated digital signatures.84 Vehicles, home
appliances, Fitbits and other portable devices, home and office security systems, and even medical
devices produce a constant stream of physical, behavioral, locational, and biometric information.85
Almost all American vehicles, for example, contain an event data recorder that “continuously
measure[s] information on a car’s speed, braking, acceleration, angular momentum, and other
similar data.86 In the home, “Siri” is now in active use on more than a half billion devices
globally.87 In the United States, as of 2019 some 69 percent of U.S. homes were using “smart”
devices, including home networking, home security, smart thermostats, smart lighting, or video
doorbells.88 Closer to the bone, medical devices such as the artificial pancreas, used by diabetics
to substitute for their inadequate insulin supply, pipe out a stream of information about somatic
operations that are unavailable even to the person in question.89
All these digital traces enable a wide range of inferences about behavior, habits, and bodies.
Together, they operate as a “sensing net” covering a large and varied slice of human behavior.90
80
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The end result will be one “in which all software needs to be spatially aware.”91 One especially
ambitious proposal involves the dispersion “smart dust,” or “nanosensors—scattered micro
devices that are smaller than grains of rice” that would be “laced ubiquitously” through urban
physical spaces.92
The sensing net torques economic logic of familiar goods. In 2017, the American appliance
manufacturer Whirlpool sought tariffs on Korean competitors LG and Samsung for flooding the
U.S. market with cheap smart devices. The Korean companies’ strategies reflected its belief that
“in a data-driven business,” the best way to expand market share is “to push prices as low as
possible in order to build your customer base, enhance data flow, and cash in” later.93 Companies
can use the data produced by, say, a fridge by “selling you recipe subscriptions, maybe, or getting
a cut of your food order,” which it places automatically when you run low.94 The physical
appliance at least “becomes (perhaps primarily) a means of producing data.”95 At some point,
personal data created by appliances will be more valuable than the appliance itself.96 Like
consumer genetic data, these flows are now largely unregulated.97 Indeed, roughly two-fifth of
firms offering paid mobile applications or devices that monitor consumer health lack even a
privacy policy.98 As a result, there are few legal constraints on the manner in which the resulting
data personal can be transformed into assets.
*

*

*

The technological and material foundations of personal data economies are barely twenty
years old. Yet these two decades have witnessed an explosion of new tools for social connectivity,
information acquisition, and more. These generate, and sometime rely on, new flows of personal
data. This is treated as an asset, either for exploitation within a firm or for resale. The next result
is a robust and interlinked series of personal data economies—the most important of which have
been detailed here.
II.

The Discontents of Personal Data Economies

Personal data economies enhance individual welfare through connectivity, search, and the
personalized tailoring of goods and services. Yet there is also widespread discontent about their
individual and social effects. The ambition to constrain some or all of these ills motivates many
proposals for new governance regimes. To evaluate governance regimes for the data economy, it
is useful to begin with its critiques.
91
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This Part offers a taxonomy of normative critiques leveled against personal data
economies. They fall into six broad categories: privacy, autonomy, exploitation, economic
inequality, democratic backsliding, and state domination. To this half-dozen found in the literature,
I add a seventh: The failure to generate beneficial public goods. Boundaries between these
categories are sometimes porous. Problems of privacy, for example, can sometimes be rephrased
as matters of autonomy, as can critiques of exploitation. Economic inequality can also be
understood as a mere aggregation of worries about individuals’ exploitation. Despite these blurred
lines, the taxonomy is helpful because it clarifies the stakes, and provides a way to sort among
different normative priorities. From the taxonomy, a general theme also bubbles up: the most
plausible and forceful lines of critique largely (although not perfectly) converge in a
consequentialist concern about the way in which platform economies, data brokers, and sensing
nets exacerbate structural inequality in society at large.
A.

Privacy

Economies of personal data raised privacy concerns from their conception. Even early
information-economy boosters recognized that a firm alchemizing personal data into economic
rents could impose privacy spillovers.99 Privacy concerns are either retail—i.e., specific to certain
affordances, firms, or sectors—or wholesale—i.e., applicable to the whole data economy. I sketch
three retail lines of criticism, and then summarize the leading global critique.
First, a firm might be criticized for failing to abide by its own privacy regulations. Data
sharing among platform economies is an example. In December 2018, a set of special arrangements
between Facebook on the one hand, and Amazon, Bing, Spotify, and Yahoo (among others)
allowed those counterparties access to users’ personal data through undisclosed exemptions to
privacy policies.100 Harms arise because users did not agree to, and so cannot stop, these transfers.
Second, a firm might fail to secure personal data from external misappropriation. Again,
harm arises from disclosures without consent and beyond user control. Data breaches are said to
cause “an increased risk of identity theft, fraud, and reputational damage,” as well as immediate
“[e]motional distress.”101 The precise rate of personal data breaches is unknown because not all
are reported.102 Between 2000 and 2010, however, one study found more than 230 data-breach
suits in federal court.103 Risk of a breach unsurprisingly rises as the volume of information being
99
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held grows.104 A breach, moreover, may trigger tort liability under state or federal law. William
McGeveran has identified fourteen different legal regimes covering data breaches, which together
create “a common set of standards for data security in the United States.”105
A third possible retail concern is that certain technological affordances built into an
application or an appliance create pervasive and unavoidable privacy risk. Consider two examples.
The first comes from the emergent sensing net: Digital assistants such as Siri and Alexa do not just
record and transmit ambient conversation (as smart-phones do), they also detect and map
movement and behavior using “lidar.”106 Google’s home alarm system initially recorded ambient
noise—without disclosing this to purchasing home owners.107 The decision to build these
affordances into the device arguably presents a distinct challenge to privacy norms.108
Second, Facebook “leverage[s] the code on third-party sites and apps used to deliver other
Facebook products--Like buttons, Login buttons, conversion tracking pixels, retargeting pixels,
and the Facebook software development kit--for the additional new purpose of tracking users” as
they interact with other web sites.109 As Dina Srinivasan explains, “when a consumer visited a
website with a Facebook plugin, Facebook piggybacked onto the requests and responses necessary
to simply display the plugins, to now also surveil the users of competitor ad sellers” whether or
not she uses Facebook.110 This data then “augment[s]” Facebook’s ad targeting.111 Here, there is
plausibly a worry not just about what is disclosed, but also about the changed relation between
firms and consumers. The marginal increase in information revelation is substantial, with the firm
gaining a whole new kind of insight into millions of its customers without a reciprocal advantage.
Worry about privacy bleeds into concern about unequal power.
Beyond these localized, retail worries, there is also a most ambitiously gauged privacy
argument against the very enterprise of extracting economic rents from personal data in the first
instance. A version of this categorical argument is offered by Shoshana Zuboff. She argues that
technologies that acquire personal data operate as “one-way mirror” erasing the possibility of

104

Benjamin Edwards, Steven Hofmeyr & Stephanie Forrest, Hype and Heavy Tails: A Closer Look at Data
Breaches, 2 J. CYBERSECURITY 3, 4–6 (2016). A variation on the data breach problem is when companies “charge a
premium price and deliver a bargain-basement service that falls below industry standards where data security is
concerned.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Data Security's Unjust Enrichment Theory, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 2477, 2491
(2020).
105
William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. Rev. 1135, 1139 (2019).
106
How
Creepy
is
Your
Smart
Speaker?,
THE
ECONOMIST,
May
11,
2019,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/05/11/how-creepy-is-your-smart-speaker.
107
Taylor Telford, Google Failed to Notify Customers It Put Microphones in Nest Security Systems, WASH. POST
(Feb. 20, 2019, 11:41 AM EST).
108
A related concern is that “the accumulation of data, including personal data, by dominant firms [in ways that]
entrenc[h] their dominant positions.” Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Data accumulation and the
privacy–antitrust interface: insights from the Facebook case, 8 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 224, 225 (2018). In
February 2019, for instance Germany’s competition authority the Bundeskartellamt prohibited Facebook from
combining users’ WhatsUp, Instagram, and Facebook data streams without their consent. Bundeskartellamt,
Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from combining user data from different sources: Background information on
the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook proceeding, Feb. 7, 2019.
109
Srinivasan, supra note 60, at 71.
110
Id. at 72.
111
Id. Apple has recently applied IPhone users to opt out of much of this tracking, to facebook’s manifest dismay.

16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3794780

interiority by rendering the psychologically internal into a digital feed.112 What is lost as a result,
she argues, is “the sanctity of the individual, the ties of intimacy, the sociality that binds us together
in promises and the trust they breed.”113 Surveillance capitalism, she argues, “rob[s] us of the lifesustaining inwardness, born in sanctuary, that finally distinguishes us from machines.”114 Although
Zuboff is not entirely clear on what reform follows from this, her analysis is at the least to
consistent with a call for a radical contraction in personal data economies.
The wholesale critique of personal data economies offered by Zuboff prickles with
difficulties.115 Her claim that “intimacy” and “sociality” are fatally comprised by social networks
is overdrawn. Connections created or sustained during the pandemic through platform economies
such as Facetime and Zoom belie her cynicism. Gauging concerns about privacy in such sweeping
terms also risks losing sight of more specific ways in which data economies can conduce to
disclosure-based harms. Moreover, Zuboff importantly misses the way in which platform
economies and sensing nets can create valuable public goods. In proceeding, therefore, I will focus
on retail rather than wholesale privacy critiques.
B.

Autonomy

A second common theme in critiques of personal data economies concerns the influence
gained by platforms and other firms over individuals’ autonomy or agency. Both terms are
important yet frustratingly imprecise.116 Autonomy, for example, might be glossed narrowly “as
abstract rationality and responsibility attributed to an individual.”117 Alternatively, Margaret Radin
has argued, a person might “be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some constitutive sense,” so
as to make “control over that ‘thing’” a necessary part of their “autonomy” that the law should
recognize.118 Radin applied this insight to residential property, personal vehicles, and wedding
rings.119 Her logic can be extended to personal data economies.
Several scholars have tried to develop the connection between data and autonomy. None
leans on Radin’s seminal work. But her approach is echoed in John Cheney-Lippold’s claim that
“datafied lives … increasingly define who we are and who we can be.”120 His account emphasizes
not just the acquisition of data but also the extraction of commercial value via predictions. This
ability to intimate future behavior is cast as a deprivation of human autonomy. In a similar vein,
Oxford philosopher James Williams argues that platform economies “threaten to frustrate one’s
authorship of one’s own life,” such that “the operation of the will … has also been short-circuited
and undermined.”121 Zuboff, again, argues that it is a per se wrong when “human nature is scraped,
112
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torn, and taken, for another century’s market product” because users are being transformed into
“means to others’ ends.”122 Zuboff uses forceful language redolent of Radin’s to critique the use
of personal data from platform economies for behavioral predictions.123 These defy “millennia of
human contest and sacrifice” by denying “the freedom of the will.”124 In the legal academy, Tal
Zarsky has defined “manipulation” in terms that cover all predictive applications of personal data
to which users are “oblivious.”125 Stanching such manipulation means changing the terms of the
personal data economy, since “personal data is the fuel of the manipulation process.”126
Like the wholesale privacy critique lodged by Zuboff, the argument from autonomy seems
overbroad. A key question is why the interventions powered by personal data are so intrusive or
offense as to violate individual autonomy. Facebook and Google monetize their personal data
streams through the sale of digital advertising.127 To be sure, these manipulate their audience; but
the same is true of all advertising. Absent concerns about capacity (e.g., for minors), it is hard to
see how even precisely targeted digital advertising is a fatal attack on human autonomy. They
simply do not all comprehensively “structure users’ conditions of possibility.”128 Further, the
vague intuition that data-based interventions are ‘too effective’ does not cash out as a clear line
that can be used to distinguish beneficial forms of targeted advertisement from improper
manipulation. More modestly, and more plausibly, concerns about autonomy are probably best
glossed as worries about the ability of platform economies and data brokers to seize a
disproportionate share of the economic surplus created by personal data economies. Again, the
question is at bottom one of power and distribution.
C.

Retail economic exploitation

Adjacent to these autonomy concerns, and often expressed in the same terms, is a worry
about the economic exploitation of individual users and contributors. This objection runs against
both the “dragnet” and the “intervention” stages of data economies.129 I offer here three examples
of arguable exploitation. The first two touch on how personal data is extracted by platform
economies. The third relates to how first-degree price discrimination arises at the back-end.
A first problem arises if users do not understand that platform economies or sensing nets
are acquiring their data. If that happens, “a subsidy is given to those data-processing companies
122
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that exploit personal data. As a result, these organizations are not charged the true ‘cost’ of the
personal data they acquire.”130
A second problem arises because—notwithstanding their sheen of novelty and
innovation—platform economies reproduce gendered divisions of labor and reward that have long
plagued industrial capitalism. In an earlier era, it was believed that “[t]he male head of the
household would be paid a family wage, sufficient to support children and a wife-and-mother, who
performed domestic labor without pay.”131 While this “family wage” concept has collapsed, a
similar gendered division of labor persists in personal data economies. There, (usually male)
architects of a platform’s code tend to be highly remunerated, whereas content contributors go
without any financial reward. In the dominant discourse employed in the tech sector, this “primacy
of the platform” is justified by the assumption that content creation—whether on review services
such as Yelp or postings on Etsy or another social media platform—just “isn’t work.”132 The labor
of content providers, “a female-dominated sector of the economy,” are instead equated to
“domestic, especially female, labor”133 that the family-wage model treats as unpaid. Platform
economies thus are a “reinvention of the family as an instrument for distributing wealth and
income.”134
Social networks that supply connectivity rather than content operate on a similarly
gendered logic. Sociologists Marion Fourcade and Daniel Kluttz argue that these networks’
acquisition of personal data rely upon preexisting social structures of trust, consent, and gift
giving.135 Platform economies subtly exploit a “natural compulsion to reciprocate” and “existing
solidaristic bond[s]” to generate a circulatory system of interactions ripe with personal data.136 The
“affective labor” that is the ordinary work of human contact and interaction is seized and
transformed into an informational asset.137 The marketing of consumer genetics similarly appeals
to altruism. It asks consumers to “give back” and to participate in a “crowdsourced healthcare
revolution.”138 As such, platform economies rely on subtle (and gendered) emotional manipulation
to commercial ends.
Third, at the last step of its economic cycle, data can be used to enable first-degree price
discrimination by which different consumers are presented with variable, individualized prices for
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the same product.139 This can harm users. For example, data brokers crunch the information
voluntarily or unwittingly supplied by consumers to offer financial goods, such as “subprime
credit,” that may be inflict a heavy toll.140 Individualized harms might also be imposed by the
sharing of erroneous data that serves to limit a person’s access to credit or goods.141 And while
first-degree price discrimination can reflect consumer preferences, it also allows sellers to
“extract[] the entire surplus by setting a price that is just below each consumer’s [willingness to
pay].”142 Further, where such discrimination takes advantage of consumer misperceptions,
consumers can end up strictly worse off.143 Even apart from welfare effects, these dynamics are “a
profound challenge to the distribution of wealth between producers and consumers.”144 Even if
Pareto optimal, that is first-degree price discrimination conduces to objectionable forms of
inequality—a possibility that leads us to the next critique.
D.

Structural economic inequality

Concerns about the equities of interaction between platforms and users or contentproviders can be scaled-up into a systemic, macroeconomic concern about the distribution of
economic rents from data economies and about their dynamic effects upon labor markets. The link
between data economies and inequality is often framed in vague and suggestive terms, using
economy-wide trends. 145 We can be more precise. I chart briefly here three specific pathways by
which data economies exacerbate aggregate economic inequalities or generate new forms of
inequitable hierarchy.146
To begin with, personal-data economies is facilitating new Taylorite strategies of
automated scheduling, task redefinition, loss- and risk-prediction in the workplace. These can have
major dignitary, distributive and economic consequences.147 A California company called
Humanyze, for example, offers employers technologies to track what their workers sit, where they
139
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are in an office, how quickly they move, how much time they spend speaking to people of the
same gender, and the amount of time they spend listening or speaking.148 Its tool allows the
extraction of a greater share of surplus value from workers, and hence a greater share of profits,
without any concomitant benefit for workers.149 Quite apart from its creepiness, it can also thwart
collective action. This further inhibits employees from securing a greater share of economic
rents.150
Second, and relatedly, the business model of certain platform-based applications may
generate a surplus simply not because of data, but through the exploitation of gaps in the legal
protections for workers. Loss-making ride-share companies such as Uber, for example, exploit the
difference between the legal protection for employees and for contractors as a way to offer lower
prices than taxi companies.151 Obviously, this is to the considerable detriment of labor. Regulatory
arbitrage may be only part of the business model of these platform economies.152 But when coupled
to the increasing control of the workplace, such platform-economy tools have the potential to
dramatically alter how gains from commerce are distributed between employers and workers.
Third, and more broadly, data economies supply new predictive tools that substitute for
human capital. These shape the overall labor market and drive economic inequality. Data-driven
machine learning is a “general purpose technology.”153 It is deployed in lieu of human labor across
many different workplaces. Advances in machine-learning since the 1980s have enlarged the slice
of the labor market for which automation is a substitute. Moore’s law means that the cost of such
substitution falls over time. Some economists argue that the resulting loss of jobs likely will strike
lower-income blue- and white-collar positions hardest.154 Others attribute declining labor share to
declining productivity and a global manufacturing capacity glut.155 Either way, among the sectors
of the labor market most likely to be undermined by automation are “[o]ffice and administrative
support, production, transportation and logistics, food preparation, and retail jobs.”156 For instance,
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in 2018, Google announced its development of technology to replace call-center workers.157 This
exacerbates a secular trend of reduced demand for blue-collar and low-skill positions, coupled to
greater demand for professional and managerial positions.158 Slimmer opportunities for middleskilled workers, coupled to greater demand for more skilled labor, polarizes incomes—at least
without a social wage.159 Income and wealth polarization have further ramifications. For example,
it is increasingly the case that wealth provides a way to opt out of the personal-data economies run
by platform economies and data brokers.160
*

*

*

In summary, all three dynamics surfaced here “set the terms that structure an engagement”
in which information is first acquired.161 The affective labor of social connection upon which
Facebook rests, or the critical engagement with goods and services that are reflected in Yelp and
Amazon reviews, yields little or no direct return.162 Where participation in a data economy allow
a firm like Facebook or Google to acquire information beyond an immediate consumer or user
interaction—for example, by tracking activity on third-party websites—the payoff to consumers
is slight. Instead, platforms, data brokers, and device manufacturers shape the conditions in which
users generate personal data, their awareness of doing so, and their expectations about how such
data will be used. This maximizes revenue for firms while suppressing payouts to users. All this
allows firms to mold how and when consumers disclose personal data without demanding a payoff.
An asymmetry in the distribution of rents is thereby baked into the architecture of personal data
economies as presently structured.
Putting these three arguments together reveals an overarching structural dynamic that
echoes Thomas Piketty’s more general critique of contemporary economic arrangements.
According to Piketty’s now famous formulation, the return to capital under contemporary
conditions has tended to exceed the growth rate. A result of this imbalance is a steady increase in
the Gini coefficient thanks to accelerating increases in high-end wealth concentrations.163 The
three structural critiques of personal data economies echo Piketty’s point that technology, among
other factors, “influence[s] the relative power of different social groups.”164 Although his analysis
places greater weight on nontechnological factors, the parallel suggests that personal data
157
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economies are likely to follow, and inscribe more deeply, wealth hierarchies accreting during the
last half century.
The structural critique developed here might be parried by noticing that firms in the data
economy offer consumers services that are worth as much, or more, than the profits accruing to
firms. Facebook’s 2019 revenues exceeded 70 billion dollars.165 Although Facebook does not
charge an access fee, experimental tests of consumers’ willingness to abandon the social network
offer a glimpse of its value. One experimental study of American liberal arts college arts students
and MTurk participants (all American) found participants asked for around $2,000 to deactivate
Facebook for a year.166 That study concluded that “the most conservative … estimates, if applied
to Facebook’s 214 million U.S. users, suggests an annual value of over $240 billion to users.”167
Yet this does not defeat the arguments from structural economic inequality. To begin with,
there is no consensus on how much value Facebook is creating for users. Studies, in practice, find
a range of valuations, including ones that undermine the conclusion that Facebook creates net
social benefits.168 Some suggest that users’ willingness to pay for Facebook is much smaller than
their willingness to accept payoffs for deactivating Facebook.169 Moreover, there is some evidence
that quitting Facebook has positive effects on both physical and mental health.170 It is not clear
that studies of Facebook’s self-reported value to users capture these spillovers. Pending better
evidence, it seems better to view the welfare analysis as inconclusive.
More importantly, the arguments from structural economic inequality apply here even if
data economies are Pareto efficient. Even if a particular data economy can be justified as a boost
to overall welfare, it might still shift the distribution of entitlements in a society in undesirable
ways. Creating a bit more wealth overall at the cost of substantially greater economic inequality is
a tradeoff that many view as regrettable.171
E.

Democratic backsliding

Can personal data economies erode democratic norms? Since the November 2016 election,
much public and political concern has focused on the possibility that personal data generated by
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platform economies can be used to foster polarization and political extremism.172 Worries about
“fake news” arise against a context of rising “partisan sectarianism,” in which “out-party hate” has
become the leading predictor of voting behavior.173 The politics of enmity, engorged by
misinformation-filled platform economies, is viewed as a serious destabilizing risk to a democratic
system. As the January 2021 attack on the U.S. Capital graphically illustrated, if people believe
that a loss at the polls will lead to the irreparable calamity of an opposition’s victory, it will pursue
extreme, anti-democratic measures to head off that prospect.
Platform economies arguably contribute to processes of democratic backsliding in three
ways. First, Facebook and Twitter enable “junk news circulation.”174 After the 2016 presidential
election, for example, the 569 sites known to reliably disseminate the highest number of false news
stories received some 60 million Facebook engagements per month.175 This dissemination
undermines the epistemic predicate of effectual democratic choice. It can also exacerbate racist,
xenophobic, and anti-Semitic ideas and movements.176 Second, a platform that depends on user
engagement has an economic incentive to promote polarizing content that induces users to spend
more time on the site. Facebook, for example, is said to have refused to make its content less
divisive for this reason.177 Third, user data harvested from platforms can be analyzed to guide
misinformation campaigns.178 Precise, individual-level information, gathered without a user’s
knowledge, is used to guide “techniques reliant on subterfuge and opacity” with the aim of
changing voting behavior.179 Among the most notorious examples of political redlining is the use
of Facebook data by the British firm Cambridge Analytica on behalf of the Trump campaign.180

172

For summaries of these concerns, see COHEN, supra note 47, at 75-77, 83-89, 96; see also Michael J.
Abramowitz, Stop the Manipulation of Democracy Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/opinion/fake-news-russia-kenya.html
173
Eli J. Finkel et al., Political sectarianism in America, 370 SCIENCE 533, 533 (2020).
174
PHILIP N. HOWARD, LIE MACHINES: HOW TO SAVE DEMOCRACY FROM TROLL ARMIES, DECEITFUL ROBOTS, JUNK
NEWS OPERATIONS, AND POLITICAL OPERATIVES 12 (2020); see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA:
HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 16 (2019) (“Facebook is … the most pervasive
and powerful catalyst of information pollution and destructive nonsense.”).
175
Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow, and Y. Chuan, Trends in the diffusion of misinformation on social media, 6
RES. & POL. 1, 2 (2019).
176
Hate groups use Facebook ads a “vehicle” for constructing narratives to justify denigration of violence against
minority groups through the propagation of narratives of those groups as “separate and hostile.” Megan Squire,
Network, Text, and Image Analysis of Anti-Muslim Groups on Facebook, 2019 J. WEB SCIENCE 1-2 (2019),
https://webscience-journal.net/webscience/article/view/77. About half of the misogynistic and racists posts that
violate Facebook’s community standards are not taken down, even when they are reported to the company. Caitlin
Ring Carlson and Hayley Rousselle, Report and repeat: Investigating Facebook’s hate speech removal process, 25
FIRST MONDAY (2020), https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i2.10288.
177
Jeff Horwitz and Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook executives shut down efforts to make the site less divisive, WALL
ST. J. (March 26, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-executivesnixed-solutions-11590507499?mod=hp_lead_pos5.
178
Platform-generated data need not be political in nature to reveal users’ policy and partisan preferences. HOWARD,
supra note 174, at 157 (“Our credit card data and city travels generate data for political inference, whether we
intends to allow this or not.”).
179
Zeynap Tufekci, Engineering the public: Big data, surveillance and computational politics, 19 FIRST MONDAY
(2014), https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v19i7.4901
180
Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge
Analytica in major data breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election.

24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3794780

The scale and effect of these campaigns is not clear. Platforms are not the sole or most
important driver of partisan sectarianism.181 It is “tough to estimate” the causal effect of false news
or ads on voting behavior.182 The best empirical studies of the Cambridge Analytica’s campaign
suggest that its impacts “are likely exaggerated,” and that the use of tailored online advertising to
change voter behavior remains “primarily an act of faith.”183 At the same time, experimental
evidence suggests that individual disengagement from social media is associated with both lower
levels of political knowledge and reduced partisan polarization.184 So perhaps the polity as a whole
would be less informed but also less divided in the absence of platform economies. Moreover,
domestic misinformation raises distinct First Amendment issues from foreign actions. If platforms
are a particularly effective way of reaching citizens—say, in particular those who ordinarily do not
vote—should its ‘manipulative’ potential be enough to place it beyond bounds for political
campaigns? The case against online misinformation is more complex than first appears.
F.

State domination

In a recent study of democracy’s history, the political scientist David Stasavage has argued
that autocratic forms of government have prevailed over nascent democracies “whenever new or
improved technologies reduced the information advantage that members had over rulers.”185 The
same dynamic is plausibly at work today: Personal data economies produce epistemic resources
that can be leveraged by a state seeking to exercise undemocratic power over its citizens.
In the United States, worry about undemocratic power focuses on how policing agencies
are leveraging personal data.186 There has been a robust debate on how the content and metadata
generated by telephone calls can be used by the federal government. To date, there has been no
known repetition of the large-scale surveillance of domestic political opposition that characterized
the 1960s.187 Overseas, the exploitation of personal data economies for repression is more
advanced. The Communist Party of China has proved adept at harnessing personal data. In the
Western province of Xinjiang, pervasive digital surveillance is used to identify “the digital
footprint of unauthorized Islamic practice.”188 Across the whole country, public surveillance
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cameras are integrated with facial recognition and artificial intelligence to create “a vast and
unprecedented national surveillance system.”189 China has also created a global market in the tools
of digital totalitarianism.190 Even democratic governments unlikely to purchase China’s
surveillance tools are exploiting personal data for state security. In India, the BJP government
introduced in 2020 a Personal Data Protection bill that requires platform economies to engage in
“data localization”—the storage of personal data within India.191 The bill also exempts the Indian
state from most limits on the acquisition and use of such data.192 By combining data localization
and unfettered state access to locally stored data, the bill pumps up the risk of state repression.193
The problem of state repression through personal data economies, in short, is intractably
entangled with privacy, autonomy, exploitation, and inequality worries. The more the state
regulates the flows and usages of personal data, the greater its ability to leverage its regulatory
authority to repressive ends.
G.

The Underproduction of Public Goods

Critical commentary on personal data economies focuses on potential harms. Little
attention is paid to the mirror-image problem of socially valuable applications of personal data
being foregone.194 Personal data economies typically realize profits via the increasingly precision
in targeted advertising. Data produced through platform economies and sending nets, however,
might also be deployed to target resources and interventions to improve public health, to uphold
environmental standards, to facilitate smooth traffic flows, and to identify and deliver muchneeded public services to marginalized populations.195 Making machine-learning instruments
developed using personal data available for the benefit or use of the general public “could facilitate
the production of genuinely innovative products on a relatively low budget.”196 And personal data
economies could give the public a better grasp on how well its elected representatives are
performing. For many things the state does, little is known about quality or efficacy. For example,
189

Paul Mozur, Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame, and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2018.
Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel & Melissa Chan, Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-policegovernment.html.
191
Manasi Gopalkrishnan, India's personal data privacy law triggers surveillance fears, DW, (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://p.dw.com/p/3l8yr.
192
Id.
193
Id. (noting recent surveillance and intimidation of political activists by the Indian government).
194
Indeed, it is more common to find the opposite claim that “databases [of personal information] have no
significant public good characteristics” and instead “are the paradigmatic example of a good whose entire value is
privately appropriable. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2000) [hereinafter “Cohen, Examined Lives”]. If this was true in 2000, I think it is no longer the
case.
195
For examples in each of these fields, see Muin J. Khoury and John Ioannidis, Big data meets public health, 346
SCIENCE 1045, 1054-55 (2014) (identifying epidemiological problems that can be addressed using personal data);
Debra Lam & John Wagner Givens, Small and Smart: Why and How Smart City Solutions Can and Should Be
Adapted to the Unique Needs of Smaller Cities, 12 NEW GLOBAL STUD. 21, 31-32 (2018) (discussing the use of
sensor nets to monitor municipal water quality); SHEKHAR AND VOLD, supra note --, at 14-15 (discussing Los
Angeles’ use of spatial computing to mitigate traffic blockages); Blake E. Reid, Internet Architecture and Disability,
95 Ind. L.J. 591, 592 (2020) (discussing the provision of services to the disabled through “smart city” initiatives).
196
Evgeny Morozov, Digital Socialism: The Calculation Debate in the Age of Big Data, 116 NEW LEFT REV. 33, 63
(2019). Release of the data itself would generate privacy objections.
190

26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3794780

information about the efficacy and the social costs of policing is scarce.197 Personal data economies
can be leveraged to fill these gaps. The failure to do so has steep opportunity costs.
The thwarted potential of socially beneficial uses of personal data is illustrated by the
failure to use locational data generated by cell-phones to map the trajectories of Covid-19
infections. “COVID-19 moves too quickly through the population to be amenable to standard
[manual] contact tracing methods.”198 In the time that manual tracers acquire information from an
infected person, and then reach their contacts, the virus may have spread to hundreds more. To
remedy his gap, digital contact tracing uses data generated by cellphones in two different ways.
More ambitiously, personal data can be used to identify intersections between the movements of a
specific infected person and others. It thus can facilitate the construction of a catalog of those who
need to be warned of potential infection.199 More modestly, locational data generated by cellphones
can be used to model the population-level diffusion of the virus.200 This allows public-health
authorities to identify specific locations that act as high-frequency transmission nodes.201 It can
also help when calculating estimates of contagion rates with different combinations of closures
and openings.202 Digital contract tracing, however, has largely failed to take root in the United
States.203 Its failure is just one of the missed opportunities to exploit personal data economies to
create important public goods.
Sharing data for the production of public good raises privacy concerns. Both Canada and
the United Kingdom, though, have developed protocols for sharing data produced by state entities
without compromising privacy. Under Canada’s Statistics Act, for example, researchers can use a
“Real Time Remote Access System” that enables data to be queried without being exposed. 204 The
United Kingdom’s Digital Economy Act creates protocols for the sharing of deidentified data with
accredited researchers.205 Generalizing from these examples, Lisa Austin and David Lie have
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proposed a system of “safe sharing” whereby “a party holding raw data with [personal data] could
allow another party to analyze the data in select ways, while blocking them from viewing the raw
data itself.”206 Their approach illustrates how epistemic public goods can be created without
compromising privacy values.
Under-utilization has not been a focus of scholarship on personal data economies. But cities
have started to grasp data as a “public good.”207 So-called smart cities that “collect and utilize an
extensive range of personal and sensitive data” can be treated as “data stewards” responsible for
wise use of that asset.208 Some scholars have argued for cities to be subject to “fiduciary-like
responsibilities to consider the ethical and privacy impacts of particular data activities and to act
with the best interests of individuals and society in mind.”209
It is not at all clear whether society suffers more from the misuse of personal data or the
failure to use personal data for public-good creation. Such failures are likely to be regressive.
Wealthier citizens are more likely to opt out of poorly performing public services, or seek
alternative provision of public good.210 Populations that are economically or socially marginal, in
contrast, will not benefit from personal data’s absent public interventions.211 The failure to
leverage the public-good potential of personal data economies, in short, will have the dynamic
effect of exacerbating existing economic disparities, in ways that resonate with the critique from
structural economic inequalities.
H.

The Costs of Personal Data Economies Recapitulated

Platform economies, data brokers, and sensing nets have been subject to a barrage of
criticism. Some of it rests on controversial metaphysical premises. Other elements have an
uncertain relationship to the empirical evidence. Yet the powerful and persuasive critiques based
on privacy, exploitation, and inequality are hard to wave away. Concerns about democratic
backsliding, state domination, the under-supply of public goods, in my view, all have some force
too. The focus of these critiques has been platform economies. Data brokers have successfully kept
a lower public profile—but there is no reason to think that these normative concerns do not bite
on their doings. Legal scholars are only now starting to explore the sensing net. Its capacious
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ability to acquire behavioral data suggests that normative objections lodged against platform
economies will also resonate there.
There is no single normative value at issue across these arguments. To the contrary, they
rest on different theories of the relation between the self and personal data economies. Critiques
sounding in autonomy (and to some extent privacy) posit a static, authentic self undermined by the
capture and commodification of personal data. In contrast, exploitation and economic inequality
argument take a dynamic view of the self as subject to economic change. Similarly, the argument
from democratic backsliding assumes that data-derived interventions have a causal effect
polarizing the public. Platform economies, that is, make people themselves worse.
Just as they start from divergent premises, these critiques invite different, contradictory
cures. The autonomy and privacy critiques could be met if platform economies did not transform
personal data into an asset.212 This would likely entail front-end prices for search and networking
services. But a switch from payment in data to payment in cash is likely to have a regressive effect.
Wealthier users are more likely to be able to afford cash payments. Data acquired from wealthy
users might also be more ‘valuable’ (for example, for targeted advertising purposes) than less
wealthy users’ data. This would exacerbate ambient economic inequalities.
Nevertheless, it is possible to rank and organize the critiques to give them a measure of
coherence. As a rough generalization, several arise from disparities of information and influence.
Concerns about exploitation, inequality, and the under-supply of public goods pivot on the
regressive effects of personal data economies. Retail privacy worries about improper sharing, data
breaches, and unanticipated affordances also have a distributive element: They are all instances in
which platform economies or sensing nets extract a larger informational surplus than consumers
reasonably anticipate. Concerns about democratic backsliding and state repression also hinge on
the emergence or reinforcement of political hierarchies. In contrast to these distributive concerns,
objections based on efficiency do not loom large in critiques of personal data economies.213
This prominence of distributive concerns follows from the basic architecture of personal
data economies. Platform economies, data brokers, and sensing nets all have a one-to-many logic
on the consumer-facing side. Collective-action costs make it difficult for users to monitor or
respond to objectionable practices. Many practices, moreover, occur in a different business-tobusiness market, and turn on quite technical details hard for consumers to comprehend. In contrast,
personal data economies provide ample opportunities for improving efficiency. Firms have strong
incentives to seek them out. Welfarist concerns can arise when platform economies such as
Facebook or Google engage in monopolist practices.214 But market concentration not only raises
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concerns of “distorted growth and high trading costs.”215 It also might dissolve the constraints that
competition might otherwise impose on exploitative or privacy-invading practices.216
III.

Governance Regimes for Personal Data

In the origin fable of Harold Demsetz’s famous property theory, the Montagne tribe living
in what is now Quebec developed a system of individual property rights to hunt for beaver pelts in
response to a spike in demand and overhunting.217 Like the Montagne, users and regulators of
personal data economies today confront a familiar resource—information rather than furs—but
unfamiliar technologies of production and use. Like the Montagne, they face a question of what
governance regime—including what sort of property rights—best encourages desirable resource
allocations, while limiting undesirable spillover costs.
The concerns aired in Part II have inspired a broad range of policy proposals, ranging from
government control of platform moderation218 to tech worker unionization.219 Few change the
basic structure of personal data economies. Rather, they fiddle at the margin. This Part zooms in
upon the boldest alternative governance proposals aimed at mitigating personal data economies’
costs. The leading proposal, tracking Demsetz, involves the creation of individual ownership rights
to data. A second affixes a fiduciary duty to platform economies. A third idea entails new structural
antitrust remedies. This survey of extant structural proposals illuminates a gap: The array of
governance tools commonly considered for personal data economies falls short of addressing all
relevant policy concerns, particularly the mitigation of structural economic inequality and the
supply of positive public goods. Some other governance intervention hence seem worth
considering.
Proposals for a new governance regime for personal data rarely linger on the question of
what legal regime applies now. But the status of personal data as property now is shot through
with ambiguity. It is said that “the law does not presently recognize a property right in a particular
piece of data.”220 Yet the tort of conversion is available when data is misappropriated.221 In
practice, platforms assert a “de facto if not de jure” proprietary interest in both data and
algorithms.222 Trade secrets also operate as “de facto property arrangements that affect large
numbers of people.”223 Platforms or other participants in personal data economies are likely under
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no general obligation to share data.224 The pervasive reliance on contract arrangements is an
implicit concession by firms with the most acute fiscal stake in the matter that in rem, property
rights are unavailable.
A.

Personal Property in Data

The idea of an alienable individual property interest in personal data is neither new nor
uncontroversial. Although it has experienced a recent revival, it dates back to the emergence of the
internet. Different iterations of the idea have been crafted to appeal to different constituencies. Yet
it has never been broadly accepted.225 Nor do standard justifications for a regime of individual
rights squarely apply in the data context. The persisting allure of an individual rights framework,
therefore, may reflect a lingering assumption that the standard form of property rights used for real
and personal property can be extended to a new and different context—even though its
justifications do not quite attach.
Proposals to treat personal data as a species of discrete property date back at least to the
1990s. In 1996, economist Harry Laudon proposed a highly regulated “National Information
Market” to allow the sale and purchase of “personal information.”226 To enter this market,
individual users and consumers would sell their data to local banks, which would bundle and sell
data on national exchanges. 227 Responses within the legal academy to Laudon’s idea were frosty.
Some argued that the institutional infrastructure of a new personal data economy would be too
expensive, that individuals would not be able to value accurate their data, and that propertization
would distort “normative understandings about acceptable and unacceptable uses of personal
data.”228 Others were concerned that “more, not less, trade” would entail “producing less, not more,
privacy.”229 Markets were perceived as inconsistent with a normatively attractive level of privacy
derived independently of users’ expressed preferences. To these concerns might be added worries
224
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about the intermediaries that Laudon posited. The closest parallel to these entities now are data
brokers. These, however, have been very successful in resisting regulation and oversight.230 By
baldly positing that banks will behave differently without supporting evidence, Laudon’s proposed
governance regime risked recreating existing dynamics.
Several efforts to realize Laudon’s vision launched and then foundered in the early 2000s.
Companies such as Personal, Datacoup, Handshake, and Yes Profile all stumbled because “the
capture and sale of web users’ traces was already a widespread practice,” and none were able to
press for legal changes that would have forced (say) data brokers to purchase that information from
individuals.231 Not all, though, were dissuaded. In one of the most prominent interventions of the
era, Paul Schwartz proposed “use-transferability restrictions in conjunction with an opt-in
default.”232 Schwartz suggested that personal data could be sold but that limits on its use and its
transferability would “follow the personal information through downstream transfers and thus limit
the potential third-party interest in it.”233 In effect, he proposed a regime of servitudes that “run”
with data and so “pass automatically to successive owners.”234 He also argued that “given the right
information and incentives,” consumers would opt in to such a regime, and that technology would
reduce the transaction costs of such contracting.235 Rather than the centralized market architecture
proposed by Laudon, Schwartz thus offered a decentralized array of venues, coupled to private
rights of action against data breaches.236
Schwartz’s model focused solely on “personal privacy,” and did not account for the other
normative critiques.237 It placed heavy epistemic and cognitive demands on consumers. For every
platform or sensing net they employ, they must provide detailed schedules of preferences. At the
time Schwartz wrote, the number of such choices would have been manageable. But as the number
of apps and tools that harvest personal data has risen, it has become less tractable. Today,
Schwartz’s proposal would likely have regressive effects given the scarcity of time and decisionmaking support in low-income communities. Just as common-law lawyers resisted the system of
servitudes in land because of the risk of excessively complex encumbrances, moreover, so
participants in personal data economies might resist Schwarz’s proposal because of high
transaction costs. Among the “features … especially likely to make servitudes problematic” are
“the remote relationship between the burdened and benefited parties, the durability and ubiquity
of the restrictions imposed, the fragmentation of rights to control use of a single resource, [and]
the potential lack of salience to purchasers.”238 The “friction and disruption” from Schwartz’s
proposal would be greater than he allows.239 In this light, it seems unlikely that Schwartz’s

230

See supra text accompanying notes – to --.
Beauvisage and Meller, supra note 45, at 7.
232
Schwartz, Property, supra note 99, at 2094.
233
Id. at 2097.
234
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (2000).
235
Schwartz, Property, supra note 45, at 2105.
236
Id. at 2111-12.
237
Id. at 2126; see supra Part II.
238
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 890 (2008).
239
Cameron F. Kerry and John B. Morris, Jr., Why data ownership is the wrong approach to protecting privacy,
Brookings Institute (June 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/26/why-data-ownership-isthe-wrong-approach-to-protecting-privacy/.
231

32
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3794780

proposal would be entertained now—except by those who value privacy and autonomy to the
extent that they wish to preclude most or all of the personal data economy.
A second wave of proposals for individual property rights broke in the late 2000s. In a
popular book, technologist Jaron Lanier argued that users should have compensation for
“information taken from them.”240 In 2009, prominent computational scientist Alex Pentland
presented a paper at the World Economic Forum in Davos calling for individual property rights in
personal data. Pentland argued for transposing “three basic tents of ownership” to the data context:
“possession, use, and disposal.”241 He also called for “the combination of massive amounts of
anonymous data to promote the Common Good.”242 Oddly, Pentland assumed a clear division
between personal (identified) data and anonymous (non-identifiable) data. But by the time he
wrote, research on deanonymization had demonstrated that any such crisp distinction was already
implausible.243
More recently, the Laudon-Pentland proposal has been taken up and expanded in several
high-profile treatments. In 2019, Senator John Kennedy (R-LA) introduced the “Own Your Own
Data Act of 2019,” which stipulated that “each individual owns and has an exclusive property right
in the data that individual generates on the internet.”244 At three pages, the Act is long on sentiment
but short on implementing detail. Harkening back to the 2014 World Economic Forum, the
musician Will.I.Am took to the pages of The Economist to argue that control of data was “a central
human value. The data itself should be treated like property and people should be fairly
compensated for it.”245 In October 2017, the European Commission proposed a data producer's
right for nonpersonal, anonymized machine-generated data.246 In 2021, internet originator Tim
Berners-Lee proposed the use of “pods,” or individualized data safes in the cloud, to house
personal data about “websites visited, credit card purchases, workout routines, [and] music
streamed.”247 A pod system is indeed being tested with dementia patients in the United
Kingdom.248
Most recently, Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl identify a concern about structural economic
inequality. On their account, the creation of personal form is a “form of labor” meriting
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compensation.249 They frame a personal property interest in personal data as a mechanism to
alleviate structural economic inequalities exacerbated by automation.250 Conceding that today
most users would earn “only a few hundred dollars a year” from the sale of their data, they argue
that once jobs have been destroyed by automation, “people will have plenty of time to supply that
data.”251 Doing so, they suggest will “make them feel like more useful members of society.”252
Like Laudon, they recognize that a market in personal data would entail both new regulatory
infrastructure253 and intermediary institutions to bundle together individuals’ contributions—
called “data labor unions” or “data vaults” depending on their audience.254
The Posner-Weyl proposal invites some of the same objections as earlier iterations of
individual property proposals, and raises a few new concerns.255 Their writings are ambiguous
about what kinds of data fall within their proposal. In some moments, they seem to suggest that
their proposal applies to data created today as a byproduct of interactions with platform economies.
At other times, they look forward to a future in which “people have time to supply” data by
concerted labor rather than as a byproduct of activities aimed at other aims.256 Moreover, unlike
the earlier generation of ‘data as property’ legal scholars, Posner and Weyl are at best indifferent
to privacy goals. Their lead example of valuable labor involves a person disclosing personal, even
intimate, details about friends’ relationships to a social network seeking to better understand its
own data.257
Posner and Weyl’s proposal is unlikely to mitigate structural economic inequalities. To see
this, we should distinguish between the market as presently structured, and the market as it might
operate in the future. At present, “personally-identified data is not scarce,”258 and hence will rarely
produce significant value. To the extent that some data has a marginally greater value than other
data, it will likely be because it has been produced by a wealthier consumer, who is (by dint of
their wealth) a more attractive object of targeted advertising. Implemented today, therefore, a
regime of the kind that Posner and Weyl propose would likely have regressive effects. To their
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credit, they acknowledge this.259 But their solution of hoping for a ‘broader range of niches” for
data production seems implausible.260 It does nothing to mitigate a future labor market
characterized by under-employment, “wage stagnation and worsening conditions.”261 To the
contrary, it is of a piece with that dystopia.
No less unpersuasive is their hypothesized future in which ‘data as labor’ produces
“supplemental income.”262 It is difficult to see this supplement could meaningful change income
distributions. Rather, the ‘data as labor’ proposal would increase demand in the low-wage, lowskill segment of the labor market only marginally. And it does nothing to make up for the middleincome positions actually lost to automation. Posner and Weyl imagine that demand for data will
grow over time because of its growing utility for training machine-learning tools.263 They pay little
attention, to the exponential growth of data, as platforms and sensing nets grow.264 Against their
optimism, therefore, it is possible to imagine a future in which data about so many forms of
behavior is so cheap to acquire and store that the marginal benefit of anything consciously
produced via intentional labor is vanishingly small. Predictions of progressive effects from a ‘data
as labor’ economy in the future, therefore, seem fragile.
B.

Data Governance through Fiduciary Duties

A second popular proposal to mitigate the costs of personal data markets uses not property
law but fiduciary principles. The most prominent iteration, tendered by Jack Balkin and Jonathan
Zittrain in 2016, focused on platform economies such as Google, Facebook, and Uber as
“information fiduciaries.”265 Elaborating the idea in subsequent work, Balkin has argued that
“certain types of online service providers [should] take on fiduciary responsibilities” towards their
users because they hold themselves out as trustworthy recipients of personal data.266 This fiduciary
duty was initially characterized as a way “to encourage creativity without facilitating betrayal” of
consumers’ trust.267 In practice, this would leave much of platform economies’ business model
intact.268 In a more recent writing, Balkin has clarified the content of fiduciary “duties of care,
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confidentiality, and loyalty.”269 Echoing Schwartz, he has explained that these would “run with
the data.”270 He has also suggested that at least certain forms of behavioral advertising would be
impermissible, so one should “not take existing business models as given.”271 The fiduciary model,
that is, can be interpreted in both narrow and broad ways.
Balkin’s model has been critiqued for failing to account for existing market structures.
Platform economies are not merely passive recipients of data; they also leverage their monopoly
status to promote the “loss of privacy and control” over personal data.272 Lina Khan and David
Pozen’s argue that since Balkin’s “user-centric” model fails to address structural problems of
concentration and market power, it “is bound to be at best highly incomplete.”273 They see no
utility in reforms without a radical transformation of market structures. Their objection to the
information fiduciary model turns on the empirical question whether a revenue model based on
targeted advertising can be cabined in morally acceptable ways.274
Even aside from Khan and Pozen’s criticisms, the information fiduciary model provides
limited traction for managing the panoply of harms canvassed in Part III. Its advocates frame it as
an intervention against platform economies, not against data brokers and sensing nets. Indeed, the
fiduciary obligation attaches to an entity “because of their relationship with another.”275 But for
much personal data entering commercial circulation beyond the platform, there is no such
relationship. Consider sensors that capture images and speech in public and private places,
monitors that track activity in physical locations, and even cookies that track activity on third-party
websites on Facebook’s behalf.276 All lack the dyadic relationship Balkin posits as necessary to a
fiduciary duty. Worse, inferences about specific individuals can be drawn not only from data
gathered from them, but also from third parties.277 To encompass the larger personal data economy,
Balkin’s model would need to be unmoored from its starting analogy to the fiduciary obligations
of doctors and lawyers. It would have to become a more free-floating, miasmatic duty of
trustworthiness and constraint. It would become, in short, a coat cut from a different doctrinal cloth
altogether.
Even in that reimagined form, moreover, a fiduciary principle would remain focused on
the “user-centric”278 concern of privacy. As we have seen, a governance regime that mitigates
269

Jack Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 132 HARV. L. REV F. 11, 14 (2020) [hereinafter “Balkin, Fiduciary
Model”].
270
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
271
Id. at 29. The concession came in response to a critical account in Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical
View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019).
272
Khan and Pozen, supra note 271, at 517-18. Confusingly, Khan and Pozen argue both that the information
fiduciary principle largely tracks existing state law, id. at 521-24, and also that it would overwhelm courts’ dockets
within new cases, id. at 524. How can both of these things be true?
273
Id. at 528; id. at 534 (criticizing the information fiduciary framework because it “characterizes Facebooks,
Google, Twitter, and other online platforms as fundamentally trustworthy actors who put their users’ interests first”).
274
Compare id. at 513 & n.74 (no), with Balkin, Fiduciary Model, supra note 269, at 28-29 (yes).
275
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 265, at 1209.
276
See supra text accompanying notes – to --; Srinivasan, supra note 60, at 42–43.
277
See Michele Loi, The digital phenotype: A philosophical and ethical exploration, 32 PHIL. & TECH. 155, 161
(2019) (noting “the possibility of discrimination harm due to generalizable knowledge, for persons who are not
identified by the data, which the data protection framework is not equipped to solve”).
278
Khan and Pozen, supra note 271, at 528.

36
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3794780

privacy concerns is not one that will equally address objections from structural economic
inequalities or the underproduction of public goods.279 At best, therefore, the fiduciary intervention
proposed by Balkin and others in respect to platform economies is a partial response to the
problems of personal data economies.
A variant on the idea of fiduciary obligations is worth mentioning because it is a step
toward the public trust model explored in Part IV.280 Michele Loi, Paul-Olivier Dehaye, and Ernst
Hafen have proposed the creation of “personal data platform cooperatives” as vehicles through
which individuals could make “collective choices” about “what data to share and with whom,” and
how the surplus from such exploitation should be used.281 Sylvie Delacroix and Neil Lawrence
have similarly proposed a “bottom up” trust mechanism in which data subjects are both settlers
and beneficiaries of trusts that manages data in their name.282 In a related vein, the Alphabet
Subsidiary Sidewalk Labs proposed the creation of a “data trust” to govern data gathered as part
of an ambitious ‘smart city’ initiative in Toronto.283 The Information and Privacy Commissioner
of Ontario, however, raised concerns about the proposed trust’s “lack of independent oversight.”284
In effect, the Commissioner worried that the trust would exercise “exceptional regulatory powers”
without itself being a public entity amenable to democratic control.285 The Sidewalk project was
canceled in March 2020, so the data trust idea was never implemented.286 Hence, it is unclear
whether a private “data trust” model that is distinct and difficult from a fiduciary model, or indeed,
the intermediaries first imagined in 1996 by Harry Laudon, is in fact feasible.
C.

Structural Antitrust Remedies

Finally, a wave of scholarship has challenged the concentration of market power in a small
number of platforms such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon. That literature has elicited proposals
aimed at fundamentally altering market structure for platform economies. Lina Khan, for example,
has argued for structural remedies that “proscribe certain organizational structures,” such that
“platform activity and commercial activity [would] be undertaken through separate corporations
with distinct ownership and management.”287 Alphabet, on this view, might be split into firms that
supply search and firms that produce content.288 Sanjukta Paul has criticized antitrust doctrine’s
279
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assumption that the “business firm is the central locus of economic coordination,” and suggested
instead making more “space for more democratic, horizontal forms of economic coordination.”289
Sabeel Rahman has argued that “Google, Facebook, and Amazon” should be treated as
“foundational utilities” and regulated as such.290
This “neo-Brandeisian” approach, unlike proposals to install individual rights or fiduciary
duties, is laser-focused on “power,” and in particular private power, rather than privacy or
consumer welfare.291 Concentrated private power is perceived as antithetical to “true democracy
and liberty in our political sphere.”292 Large platforms, it is suggested, wield excessive influence
not just by shaping flows of information and public debate,293 but also more directly by wielding
disproportionate influence as lobbyists in legislatures.294 Interventions aimed at fracturing
platforms therefore rest on the (controversial and unsupported) normative premise that a desirable
understanding of democracy requires a specific diffusion of both private and public power.295
These structural remedies may well have substantial effects on privacy, innovation, and
digital flows of speech and information. But there are reasons for resisting the temptation to view
them as panaceas. First, as this approach’s leading proponents candidly admit, it is far from clear
that federal agencies and courts have the political will necessary to execute a neo-Brandesian
program.296 Second, arguments for new antitrust enforcement are focused almost exclusively upon
platform economies. No argument has been advanced that data-broker and sensing-net parts of the
economy are overly concentrated. Indeed, available evidence suggests that neither market is
presently characterized by concentration of the kind that might trigger Sherman Act liability.297
Since many of the harms canvassed in Part II are plausibly thought to arise as a consequence of
data brokers and sensing nets, an antitrust-only approach will leave them unchanged. Third,
competition may be consistent with exploitation, massive privacy losses, and economic inequality.
E-commerce platforms in China, for example, are characterized by “fierce competition” with no
dominant firm akin to Amazon, and yet abound with “group deals, social media, gaming, instant
messaging, short-form video, and live-streaming celebrities.”298 Competition may thus be
consistent with many of the critiques of personal data economies adumbrated in Part II.
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Finally, the effect of antitrust remedies upon the larger labor market will vary dramatically.
Breaking up platforms with large workforces (e.g., Amazon and Uber) would mitigate monopsony
effects, perhaps allowing wages to rise.299 But most of the interventions proposed—such as
separating search from content—are unlikely to have labor market effects since the ratio of market
value to firm size has “exploded” for firms such as Apple, Google, and Facebook.300 The historical
record also suggests reasons for caution. Looking back at the major antitrust remedies issued
against AT&T and IBM, it remains “hard to know exactly how much they shaped” product
markets.301 It seems wise to maintain a certain modesty about the ramifications of complex
structural interventions by constrained government actors in the dynamic context of technological
and social change.
If antitrust succeeds in breaking up large platforms, the effect on national politics is also
indeterminate. The empirical literature on campaign finance contributions by individuals and
corporations suggests a more complex story than the neo-Brandeisian account. For the past two
decades, corporate expenditures have been less ideological and more focused on incumbents than
the spending of individual executives of the same company.302 It has aimed at influencing policy
outcomes, not electoral outcomes. The largest tech firms did not build up “a large lobbying
presence” in Washington, D.C. until after 2010, when they perceived a rising risk of regulation.303
They have since focused on “immigration, net neutrality, rules governing advertising, and
company-specific issues.”304 The idea that this represents a failure of democracy rests on the
(strong) assumption that the policy outcomes that these firms aim to foster are themselves
democratically problematic.305 Because corporate spending flows to established rather than
insurgent candidates, it may buffer partisan sectarianism in ways that have positive, system-level
effects even if they impede certain regulatory reforms. A world in which Amazon, Facebook, and
Google are spending less on political influence is not necessarily a world in which policy outcomes
are more tightly linked to popular preferences. It might be that ramping up antitrust scrutiny on
firms in the personal data economies in effect increases the relative influence of other corporate
actors. Where Amazon steps back, for example, this might simply leave Walmart with more
influence. It is premature to assume this outcome is more ‘democratic.’
More intensive antitrust enforcement in the personal data economy may well have salutary
effects on privacy, innovation, and perhaps certain kinds of democratic dysfunction. Given the
federal dominance in antitrust policy-making, though, it is also a hostage to political fortune. For
these reasons, while it may be part of an effective regulator’s toolkit, it is also unlikely to be a
cure-all for the problems canvassed in Part II.
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D.

The Regulatory Gap in Personal Data Economies

The leading proposals for regulation of personal data economies are not likely to address
all of the pressing normative concerns raised by their operation. Proposals to create individual
entitlements to data, now more than two decades old, have never successfully addressed their
considerable logistical and practical impediments. They lean on implausible assumptions about
individuals’ capacity for knowing and controlling their own data use. They are also unlikely to
mitigate the regressive effects of commodifying personal data, and are prone to exacerbating
privacy losses. The imposition of a fiduciary duty upon platform economies, in contrast, would
reach only a portion of the firms trading personal data as an asset. Its impact would depend on the
uncertain extent to which platforms’ business models would have to change. While the scope of
those obligations in familiar contexts is tolerably clear, how they would apply in new digital
environments remains up in the air. Finally, structural antitrust remedies would accomplish
important goals, including perhaps better privacy arrangements. But they too would be partial in
scope, uncertain in effect, and largely targeted at welfarist ends orthogonal to the critiques lodged
in Part II.
All these interventions, in short, rest on powerful justifications. Yet none takes up all
structural economic effects of personal data economies. Nor does any mitigate the absence of
positive public good production. There is therefore still room in the regulatory toolkit for
something more when it comes to new personal data economies.
IV.

The Public Trust in Data

The repertoire of structural responses to personal data’s pathologies can be enriched,
surprisingly, by reaching back to a common-law doctrine of property crafted in a nineteenth
century society only passingly familiar with the perils and pleasures of commodifying information.
The doctrine in question is called the “public trust.” This Part explores the possibility of a “public
trust in data” as an instrument that states and localities can deploy to address some of the harms
arising from personal data economies.
To develop the case for a public trust in personal data, I begin by setting out the doctrine’s
common-law origins and American applications. I then explain why there is a close fit along
several margins between earlier uses of the public trust and its proposed deployment in the digital
age. Parallels exist between the kinds of resources subject to management under public trust
doctrine in the past and personal data. They also run between past and present justifications for the
creation of public trust. Finally, I suggest that the public trust form can be adapted to address the
specific distributional and public-good related problems of personal data economies. That is, it is
a way of durably bundling together solutions to several problems created by data economies.
Through user fees, limits on permissible data deployments, and mandates to create public goods,
a public trust can mitigate some of the power asymmetries and regressive effects of present data
economies. At the same time, the trust can employ safeguards to foreclose governmental misuses
of data, much as the rich personal data disclosed to social security and tax authorities is shielded
from misuse. And through a trustee or public enforcement mechanism, all these constraints can
simultaneously be given durable effect.
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To be very clear, what follows is not intended as a comprehensive account of public data
trusts. There are too many kinds of data, and too many local specifities, to allow for that. Rather,
the aim of this Article is to provide a ‘proof of concept’ for a generally applicable legal idea. I
hence close by offering general suggestions about how a public trust for data might be
implemented by state or local governments in respect to sensing net data and extensions into
platform economies.
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine as a Resource for Governance

The core ambition of public trust doctrine is to facilitate long-term management of assets
to benefit a broad cross-section of the public.306 An asset in “public trust” is owed and managed
by the state. Yet the public trust doctrine differs from the idea of “public land” owned by the state
free of any supervening obligation.307 Instead, the state has obligations of trusteeship “to protect
the people's common heritage.”308 These constrain its ability to authorize wholesale private
exploitation of a public-trust asset.309 At the same time, certain controlled forms of commercial
exploitation, including the alienation of some ‘sticks’ of the property bundle, may be allowed.
Importantly, the balance struck between public and private uses of a trust asset must account for
both the risk that a resource enjoyed by a broad public may be spoiled or exhausted through
commercial exploitation, and also the possibility that state actors fail to meet their obligations to
ensure public resources are properly husbanded and avail the public as a whole.310 A further
advantage of the public trust established through either legislation or state constitutional text is
that it creates a platform for democratic deliberation and decision about an asset’s mix of uses.
Post hoc judicial review locks in democratic choices and guards against later defection.
Nevertheless, like any other doctrinal tool used to further important policy goals, the public
trust doctrine is no panacea. On the one hand, its promise in the digital context derives from its
combination of rules meant to preserve an asset for common enjoyment, with permissions for
controlled commercial exploitation. Even as it would allow the continued commercial use of
306
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personal information, therefore, a public trust in data could be used for promoting privacy,
dampening regressive distributional effects, enabling democracy, and eliciting the production of
public goods. On the other hand, while a public trust in data can be easily established at a state or
local level, a national-level trust would face practical and legal impediments. The public trust
model, furthermore, might only fit certain kinds of data. Still, it would be premature to allow these
barriers to preempt experimentation. Only by pursuing its possibilities through trial and error that
the doctrine’s potential might be realized.
The idea of a “public trust” in a common asset, under public ownership and control but
subject to controlled public usage and limited private exploitation, has a long history. It can be
traced back to Roman law.311 Folded into English common-law, it has been part of American
jurisprudence since the Republic began.312 Its active use, however, traces back to the Progressive
Era, when it was deployed as a prophylactic against legislative defalcation of resources enjoyed
by the people in common. The ensuing history of public trust doctrine, summarized here, testifies
to its adaptability and its capacity for handling shifting mixes of public and private usages.
Early American cases identified a public trust in resources such as oysters and fish. In the
1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that navigable
waters were “common to all the people, and that each has a right to use them according to his
pleasure,” and so the public could not be excluded from oyster picking in the tidal Raritan River.313
Two decades later, Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote for the U.S. Supreme Court—again in a case
about the Raritan River—that “a public trust [existed] for the benefit of the whole community, to
be freely used by all for navigation and fishery.”314 This public trust doctrine, the Court ruled four
years later in a case about navigable tributaries, applied as background law to states other than the
thirteen original colonies.315 In these early cases, the Court rejected private claims to exclude the
public from a resource, such as a navigable way or an oyster bed, while also underscoring a positive
obligation on the state to maintain the resource’s availability.
The leading American case on the public trust doctrine emphasizes the judiciary’s
obligation to protect a resource from the corrupt deployment of state power.316 At issue in Illinois
311
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“right to fisheries” in tidal waters that is “vested in the state and open to all”).
314
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842).
315
Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How) 212, 215-26 (1845) (“A right to the shore between high and low water-mark
is a sovereign right, not a proprietary one…. Why? Because rivers do not pass by grant, but as an attribute of
sovereignty. The right passes in a peculiar manner; it is held in trust for every individual proprietor in the state or the
United States, and requires a trustee of great dignity.”); id. at 228-29 (explaining that common law doctrines of land
applied to newly admitted states, such as Alabama); see also Ryan, supra note 4, at 153-55 (providing background
to Pollard).
316
See Sax, supra note 3, at 489 (describing the Illinois Central case as “[t]he most celebrated public trust case in
American law”); see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 802 (2004) (discussing the prominence
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Central Railroad v. Illinois was the Lake Front Act, an 1869 state legislative measure granting the
eponymous railroad a portion of the Chicago lakeshore and over one thousand acres of submerged
land for a new depot.317 Four years later, the state legislature revoked the grant. The railroad, of
course, sued. It alleged (among other things) that the Act violated its “vested rights” in lakebed
property. The resulting law-suit ended in a split judgment from the U.S. Supreme Court. Key,
though, to the Court’s ultimate holding was its conclusion that the 1869 transfer of submerged land
had never been valid—and thus the railroad had not been deprived of any “vested right”—because
of the public trust doctrine.318
Writing for the Court’s majority, Justice Stephen Field held that the state might hold title
in the land, but such title was “held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties”319 He went on to explain that the state could
neither “abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable
waters and soils under them,” nor “leave them entirely under the use and control of private
parties.”320 Hence, the land could only be alienated if doing so promoted “the interests of the
public” and had no “substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.”321
Illinois Central’s holding reflects mistrust of concentrated private power, whether
manifesting as an interest-group lobby or as the monopolistic owner of an asset that would
otherwise avail a broad swathe of the public. How did it come to pass? To constitutional law
scholars today, Justice Field is notorious as a “pioneer and prophet” of the laissez-faire
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 322 But Field was also a
Jacksonian Democrat willing to “summarily … divest a major American company of an
exceedingly valuable property” to forestall “corruption and special privilege.”323 Whether or not
the Lake Front Act in fact was induced through corrupt means,324 the Court’s ruling hinged on its
perception of interest-group capture. Illinois Central thus embodies bilateral constraints, arising
out of the public trust doctrine, upon the state as owner and manager, and also upon private firms
and individuals as potential owners and users. Its inalienability rule reflects a commitment to
preserving public ownership and hence democratic control. That is, it affirms democracy, just as
of the Illinois Central decision); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 737 (1986) [hereinafter “Rose, Comedy of the Commons”] (describing
Illinois Central as the “most famous assertion of the public trust theory”); see also Protect Our Parks, Inc. v.
Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.) (underscoring Illinois Central as central to public
trust doctrine).
317
146 U.S. 387, 440-48 (1892).
318
Id. at 453.
319
Id. at 452.
320
Id. at 453.
321
Id. Now Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s recent discussion of the public trust doctrine emphasized these constraints
on alienation. Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2020)
322
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971 (1975)
323
Id. at 994.
324
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 316, at 893 (“[A]lthough the documentary record from 1869 cannot be said
definitely to establish that the Illinois Central used corrupt means to facilitate the enactment of the Lake Front Act, it
probably leans in that direction.”).
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it keeps a beady eye on its derailment. Finally, it is—much like the public utilities and broad
reading of the Sherman Act other contemporary scholars are recovering—a Progressive Era effort
to manage concentrated private power by endowing the state with power and still shackling the
manner in which such power is exercised.325 Hence, it is a rule concerned with power, and oriented
toward democratic ends through a mix of public control and ex post judicial safeguards.326
Before the end of that century, the Supreme Court went on to endorse applications of the
public trust doctrine to riverine resources327 and wildlife.328 The Illinois Central decision also
prodded state courts to till independently the same jurisprudential field.329 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, for instance, extended the public trust to recreational uses of lakes, such as “sailing, rowing,
fishing, skating, [and] taking water.”330 In a famous series of twentieth-century cases, the New
Jersey Supreme Court identified a public trust in Atlantic beach access, 331 while Pennsylvania’s
high court found the “ambient air” to be subject to trust duties.332 In the wake of Joseph Sax’s
influential scholarship recovering the doctrine in the 1970s,333 lawyers in the nascent
environmental movement deployed it aggressively across a range of new contexts.334
States differed in how they implemented the public trust doctrine. In some, a public trust
meant simply that “the state's title to certain resources is impressed by a trust in favor of particular
public uses” or that “that certain resources are subject to a presumption that they will be devoted
to particular public uses unless the state legislature specifically legislates to the contrary.”335 In yet
other states, the doctrine has been constitutionalized.336 More recently, lower federal courts have
divided over whether the public trust doctrine could extend to federal government assets.337
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Ryan, supra note 4, at 161-62 (noting that the public trust doctrine operates both as a constraint upon and a grant
of sovereign authority).
326
Concerns have been raised about the “democratic deficit” created by judicial enforcement of the public trust
doctrine. Merrill, Public Trust, supra note 310, at 284. This argument rests on the fallacy of composition: It assumes
a polity cannot be democratic unless all its consistent elements are democratically responsive. But this is plainly
false. No one thinks that elected leaders should have plenary power over police forces, election management, or the
regulation of speech to ensure democratic responsiveness. The public trust doctrine is simply another way of
promoting democracy by assuring some minimum level of security (here of assets) as against public misuse of
private capture.
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Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-25 (1894)
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Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527, 529 (1896).
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Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 316, at 738 (“Illinois Central sparked a new line of state ‘public trust’
jurisprudence.”).
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Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
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See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n., 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984) (public easement to access beach);
Borough of Neptune v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 47 (N.J. 1972) (public use of beach).
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Robinson Twp., Washington Cty. v. Com., 83 A.3d 901, 955 (2013).
333
Rose, Idea of the Public Trust, supra note 3, at 352.
334
For a summary, see Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L REV 631, 643-56 (1986).
335
Merrill, Public Trust, supra note 310, at 261-62.
336
See, e.g., Pa. Envt'l Def. Found. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 161 A.3d 911, 933 (Pa. 2017) (finding state
constitutional obligations to “prohibit the degradation, diminution, and depletion of our public natural resources”
and “act affirmatively via legislative action to protect the environment”); Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding
Co., 413 P.3d 549, 558 (Wash. 2018) (noting the public trust doctrine’s “constitutional underpinning”).
337
Compare Alec L,. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) (no), with Juliana v. United States, 863 F.
Supp. 3d 1224, 1259 (D. Or. 2016), overruled on other grounds 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (yes).
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The public trust doctrine can be put into play by ex post review of how an asset is used, or
analysis of the interest-group dynamics around how the asset is used. Taking the second tack,
Illinois Central limited the alienation of public trust assets by asking whether a sale furthered “the
interests of the public” and had no “substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.”338
But this has not locked reviewing courts into one modality of review. As a recent federal
district court about the use of Chicago public trust land for the Obama presidential library explains,
there are several ways of implementing a public trust.339 The district court noted that where a
public trust is statutorily designed over land that has never been submerged, a reviewing court
using Illinois law applies a minimal form of review. It ask only whether the law creating the trust
“is sufficiently broad, comprehensive and definite to allow the diversion” at issue.340 Where
submerged land is at issue, though, the reviewing court engages in more intensive review. It asks
whether “the ‘primary purpose’ of a legislative grant is ‘to benefit a private interest.’”341 In a
similar vein, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held that courts should take a “close look” at decisions
taken by public authorities respecting a public trust asset. This approach is akin to the “‘hard look’
that federal courts have said is required in reviewing consequential decisions by environmental
and consumer safety regulatory decisions.”342 Courts in Idaho, North Dakota, and California take
the same tack.343 In Wisconsin, the “hard look” approach to public-trust assets has congealed into
a more substantive form, with courts considering five factors, including the extent of public
control, the existence of a public purpose, and the disappointment of those previously using the
public asset.344 Like Illinois Central, these decisions reflect a substantive commitment to
democratic control coupled to an awareness of democracy’s frailties.
A virtue of the public trust doctrine, in sum, is that it is very ductile and so capable of
flexing to fit over many different kinds of assets—from oysters and fish to navigable passage to
fresh-water to park land. Its overriding touchstone is democratic control of common resources
tempered toward the preservation of that asset. It is also durable: It provides a way to entrench a
persisting governance framework for an asset. The question today is whether it can be adapted to
the personal data context.
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Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
The district court in that case denied relief on public trust ground, a holding that was reversed on appeal by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with then-Judge Barrett writing, on Article III standing grounds. Protect Our
Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 385 F. Supp. 3d 662 (N.D. Ill. 2019), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 971
F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2020)
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Id. at 678.
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Id. at 682.
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Merrill, Public Trust, supra note 310, at 281.
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See, e.g., Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 628-31, 671 P.2d 1085, 1091-94
(1983) (requiring a ‘close look’ at conveyance of trust property); In re Stone Creek Channel Improvements, 424
N.W.2d 894, 902-03 (N.D. 1988) (closely examining administrative record of public trust’s disposal); National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983) (same).
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Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (1970) (summarizing and adopting Wisconsin
law).
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B.

Fitting Data within a Public Trust Framework

The public trust form has potential in the personal data context because of congruities of
form and function. First, there is a fit between the formal qualities of data as an asset and the formal
qualities of other assets subject to the public trust doctrine. Second, there is a close match between
the jurisprudential ambitions baked into the public trust and the desirable mix of public and
commercial uses of personal data.
1.

Data is an Archetypal Public Trust Asset

Let’s start with a negative: There is a profound doctrinal and intellectual mismatch between
the standard individualized form into which property is usually sliced, and the way in which
personal data is circulated and exploited. This incongruity emerges most clearly in the sharp
mismatch between the leading justification for creating discrete, fungible property interests and
the manner in which value is in fact extracted from personal data.
Supreme Court precedent on property in information strongly suggests that there is no
individualized property interest in personal data. At least as a matter of the black-letter law,
therefore, the aggregations of data that comprise the most important asset in the personal data
economy are simply not within the private property system. The leading decision on information
aggregations is Justice O’Connor’s 1991 opinion Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.345
Feist concerned a copyright claim to the compilation of names, addresses, and telephone numbers
in a white-pages directory. Taking originality as a constitutional floor, the Court held that the
“selection, coordination, and arrangement of … white pages do not satisfy the minimum
constitutional standards for copyright protection.”346 Mere “facts” are “uncopyrightable.”347 After
Feist, lower courts have found compilations to be copyrightable only when they evince some
“judgment” about divisions within data or summary statistics.348 Whether a particular aggregation
created through personal data economies reflects sufficiently creativity depends, of course, on its
particular facts. But in at least one decision, locational data generated through a sensing net has
been characterized as beyond copyright’s constitutional domain.349 So even when a given database
architecture can be copyrighted, the actual data within it will not thereby become property.350
Although contract, trade secret, antitrust, privacy, and other bodies of law may inflect how
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499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Id. at 362.
347
Id; see also Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918) (rejecting the idea of “property in
news”).
348
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
349
Cyrus Farivar, Judge, Siding with Google, Refuses to Shut Down Waze in Wake of Alleged Theft, at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/12/judge-siding-with-googlere-fuses-to-shut-down-waze-in-wake-ofalleged-theft.
350
Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 641 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (rejecting the
idea that “a copyright owner to use copyright law to block access to data that not only are neither copyrightable nor
copyrighted, but were not created or obtained by the copyright owner”); Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d
1377, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although the compilation of public information may be subject to copyright in the
form in which it is presented, the copyright does not bar use by others of the information in the compilation.”).
346
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information can be alienated or used, constitutional basics dictate that data is “largely free from
properly rights”351 defined in terms of private ownership.
This absence of an individualized property interest in information means that there can be
no objection from prior owners to the recognition of a common, aggregate form of property in
personal data. In particular, it vitiates objections on Fifth Amendment grounds pursuant to the
Takings Clause. It does not supply, though, a positive reason for adopting a public trust for data.
Yet from another perspective, the economic logic of property rights does conduce well to
an aggregative, common governance regime. An individualized, granular, and standardized mode
of property is appropriate when social value is realized through the partition of assets. In the
personal data economy, however, value is created through aggregation.352 A single data point is
rarely of much value on its own, at least unless it concerns a celebrity or public figure. This means
that the commercial value of personal data emerges only when it has been lumped together. It also
means that while a few harms associated with personal data economies concern individualized
data, many emerge only after aggregation. As a rough first cut, privacy, dignity, and exploitation
worries attach to discrete items of data without regard to aggregation. In contrast, economic
inequality, democratic backsliding, state dominance, and the underproduction of public goods are
associated with data aggregates. To the extent the law seeks to mitigate the latter as well as the
former, it should intervene in respect to data aggregates, not target the flow of discrete bits of
information.
The public trust is commonly deployed for assets that are hard to slice up into discrete,
individualized assets. These include clean ambient air,353 navigable waters,354 ground water,355 the
recreational use of a lake,356 and beach access.357 Divisible resources, such as oysters and fish,
might be parceled out by quota systems, but their component items are fungible and better
considered as aggregates. As such, the public trust has developed for assets with the same relation
to aggregation as personal data.
Further, while the harms of personal data economies cannot be captured without an
accounting of data in its aggregate form, the individuation of data as property does not yield the
payoffs associated with other discrete and parceled forms of data. In the leading economic account
of individual property rights schemes, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argue that the transaction
costs of dealing in property are a function of information costs imposed on third-parties.358 “As a
351

Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (2018). For example, of particular relevance to the
sensing net, “manufacturers … generally cannot claim trade secret ownership rights in the data and information
generated by the devices they sell to customers.” Id. at 16.
352
KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 29, at 56-58 (describing a widely used process of “data capture and generation
through data preprocessing and aggregation” called “CRISP-DM”).
353
Robinson Twp., Washington Cty. v. Com., 623 Pa. 564, 652, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (2013).
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Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842).
355
Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 399-403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (public
trust doctrine protected groundwater tributaries of navigable waters).
356
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (1983).
357
See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass’n., 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984).
358
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J.
357, 359 (2001) (“[P]roperty imposes an informational burden on large numbers of people, a burden that goes far
beyond the need for nonparties to a contract to understand the rights and duties of contractual partners.”).
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consequence, property is required to come in standardized packages that the layperson can
understand at low cost.”359 Because these information costs “impinge upon a very large and openended class of third persons”360 in market contexts, standardization is necessary to trade’s viability.
Merrill and Smith point out that even though items of personal property can vary across in
multitudinous ways, legal standardization is most useful “in connection with the dimensions of
property rights that are least visible, and hence the most difficult for ordinary observers to
measure.”361
This logic does not translate well into the personal data context. The standardization of
data does not have the same payoffs as the standardization of land and chattels. Rather, it presents
different and sharper challenges. Personal data is much more difficult to standardize than goods.
Data from the varied digital tributaries feeding the larger personal data economy will be as varied
as personal property, but will lack the manifest and observable qualities of “size, shape, color, or
texture” that obviate certain forms of standardization.362 Data will vary in nature and content
depending on whether it comes from a cellphone, a vacuum cleaner, a dating app, an artificial
pancreas, or a public surveillance camera.363 It will not reliably have “complementary attributes,”
while the “information-hiding and limited interfaces” used to standardize land and chattels may be
available only by losing precisely that which creates value in the first instance—the informational
content of the data.364 Standardizing will often both require large investments in computation, and
would likely come with heavy informational losses.
This is not to say that data is on all fours with assets historically subject to a public trust.
The latter commonly preexist man-made action or commercial investments, and can easily be seen
to require protection from such investments. Yet this distinction, while real, is easy to overdo.
Assets such as lakebed property close to Chicago or fresh water near Los Angeles merits protection
not because it is valuable in isolation. To the contrary, it has value—and needs legal shelter—
because of commercial investments in proximate real property. The noncommercial interactions
swept into social media networks can, similarly, be thought of as a ‘natural’ phenomenon that
accrued value because of a shift in locus.365
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Id.; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (2000) [hereinafter “Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization”]
(arguing that “the objective [in designing property rights] should be to minimize the sum of measurement (and error)
costs, frustration costs, and administrative costs” though “optimal standardization”).
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Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 802 (2001)
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Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 359, at 34.
362
Id.
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An exception is locational data, which will be possible to standardize.
364
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1703 (2012); see also id. at 1705
(“Because delineation costs are not greater than zero, which strategy one uses and when one uses it will be dictated
in part by the costs of delineation – not just the benefits that correspond to the use-based purposes of the property”).
365
A possible distinction between assets traditionally subject to a public trust and data is the former’s rivalrous
quality. That is a public trust is established when an asset is capable of exhaustion. Data, however, cannot be
exhausted: It is nonrivalrous. There are traces of this idea in some cases. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 432, 658 P.2d 709 (1983). But reported decisions do not reflect a purely instrumental account
of what is and what is not a public trust. To the contrary, they reflect a normative understanding reflecting a sense of
what ought to be in the public as opposed to the private domain. I am grateful to Lee Fennell for discussion of this
point.
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The public trust form, all said and done, is well-fitted in theory to the governance and
management of personal data. Information is not personal property. It comes in aggregates that are
poor fits for the day-to-day system of sliced-up, discrete property entitlements for chattels and
land. And the principal justification for cleanly individuated and sharply distinguished property is
largely inapposite in modern data economies.
2.

The Justifications for the Public Trust Doctrine Apply to Personal Data

At its core, the public trust is a governance regime designed “to protect the people's
common heritage” from public and private misuse. 366 An asset fit for public trusteeship,
accordingly, is a “common” one in the sense that it can be enjoyed by an economically and
sociological varied public. Fishing for trout or oysters, larking about on a sandy Atlantic beach, or
enjoying fresh potable water—all these are goods enjoyed by the public at large. A rule of common
access is markedly progressive in its distributional effect. Moreover, in each case, the asset in
question is durable: it is a resource that has historically been enjoyed from one generation to the
next—and is therefore a legitimate object of people’s expectations.367
At a high level of generality, there are five parallels between these justifications and the
regulatory gaps to be found in public data economies. To begin with, the pools of information
created through engagement with platform economies and sensing net are the product of common
labor. Their value exists thanks to the mutual expression of our “natural compulsion to reciprocate”
and “existing solidaristic bond[s].”368 On familiar Lockean grounds, that endows their collective
creator—not one single person, but a networked assemblage of all—with a collectively held
title.369 The public trust hence puts ownership in the hands of those who deserve it, , and allows
them to reap a fair return via user fees.
Second, personal data is not only created by common, albeit uncoordinated, action. It could
also be designed for the enjoyment and benefit of all, rather than for the benefit of a narrow coterie
of monopsonistic purchasers and brokers. That is, personal data creates a choice: Should it be
exploited for the good of the few, or titrated for the benefit of the many? The public trust in data
is a way to create democratic control over a resource’s use—barring undesirable effects and
eliciting public goods.
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Id. at 441.
Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (1970) (noting the role of public expectations in
justifying a public trust).
368
Fourcade and Kluttz, supra note 135, at 10.
369
See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690)
(“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”). Locke justified the individual’s
ownership right by the tendency of individual ownership to conduce to more productive uses of land. Which “does
not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind.” Id. at 23. By crude analogy, the assetization of aggregate
data serve the same net welfarist end. Conscripting Locke for the cause of common property in information is not as
odd as it might first seem. In the informational domain, Locke opposed the Licensing Act of 1662 because of the
chill it cast on “authors’ abilities to create derivative works, inhibiting communal knowledge and progress.
Alexander D. North over, “Enough and As Good” in the Intellectual Commons: A Lockean Theory of Copyright and
the Merger Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1374 (2016). He urged a “limited copyright term that promote[d] a
robust public domain.”
367
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Third, personal data as an asset is durable. It cannot be exhausted (although its misuse can
yield spoilage of the public square). It endures for generations.370 The reservoirs of personal data
being filled now are thus as much a kind of common heritage as the air we breathe. What is spoiled
is less the resource, but the ambient social conditions of equality and adequate resources for all
that make personal data economies useful in the first instance.
Fourth, several of the most penetrating normative challenges of personal data economies
arise from disparities of information and influence between firms and the public. Across varied
fronts, the concentration of profits and knowledge in a small number of firms is a fulcrum of
normative concern. Both platform economies and sensing nets extract data that firms value in ways
users cannot. This many-to-one character of many platform economies, which is baked into both
design and technological detail, spills over into another asymmetry: Even if Facebook yields
substantial gains for individual users, the sheer gap between their numerosity and Facebook’s unity
has distributive effects. Small per-person profits captured by a single firm from millions daily
generates a large, lopsided concentration of both wealth and influence. Technical and legal
complexity allowing firms to exploit workers’ and users’ cognitive weak spots only exacerbates
this tilt.371 The public trust doctrine changes this many-to-one dynamic into a one-to-one contest.
It hence levels the playing field.
This leveling means the public trust can be a direct response to many of the critiques lodged
against data economies. Concerns about exploitation, inequality, and the under-supply of public
goods are all thus best understood as objections to the regressive dynamics layered into personal
data economies. Retail privacy worries about improper sharing, data breaches, and unanticipated
affordances also have a distributive character: In addition to the first-order objection to privacy
losses, they are all instances in which platform economies or sensing nets extract a greater
informational surplus than consumers reasonably anticipate. Concerns about democratic
backsliding and state repression are also objections to certain kinds of asymmetrical arrangements;
they focus, however, on political rather than economic hierarchies. The America public trust
doctrine as revived and rearticulated by Illinois Central provides a well-tailored vehicle for
addressing those redistributive concerns. From its inception, it was understood as a means of
curbing the influence of powerful interest groups over important common assets.372 The Illinois
Central Court conceived of the problem presented by the Lake Front Act in terms of legislative
corruption, resulting in the improper transfer of assets to the company.373 The state today may not
act corruptly. It rather fails, either by negligence or undue influence, to prevent immediate harms
or larger structural imbalances from materializing. As with the Lake Front Act, the effect is to
allow an undue part of the value created by a public resource to flow to small number of firms.
The data public trust corrects for that.
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Anya E.R. Prince and Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data,
105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1274 (2020) (discussing this problematic in the insurance context).
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Cf. ROSENBLATT, supra note 151, at 199 (explaining how Uber would not supply a handbook to drivers, leaving
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See text accompanying notes – to --.
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Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451-52 (1892) (noting concerns about the Lake Front Act);
Kearney and Merrill, supra note 316, at 806 (arguing that Justice Field’s opinion offered “a narrative of monopoly
privilege subverting the public interest”).
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Fifth and finally, at the remedial end, the public trust harnesses “checks and balances of
government” to prevent an asset’s misuse, but at the same time reposes no “blind” trust in the
state.374 It accounts for both market and government failures. Hence, from Justice Field’s opinion
in Illinois Central onward, the public trust doctrine has been organized around the creation of
judicial mechanisms to ward off various ways in which government might connive with interest
groups to spoil or alienate an asset to the detriment of the public at large.375 It is a means to regulate
“the collective ownership [of] public property” through a mix of “inalienability” rules and other
restraints.376 Although the Illinois Central Court enforced an inalienability rule to void the transfer
of Chicago’s lakefront, the doctrinal entailments of a public trust can be more subtle and varied,
extending from a light review of the formal qualities of an asset’s use to a hard look at the motives
and justifications for a particular arrangement. A public trust might also be a semicommonsarrangements in which common usages are mixed with extractive private uses.377 Similarly, a
public trust in data can be hedged around with rules to prevent the government’s misuse of its
contents, such as the kind of limits on disclosure and sharing that apply to social security and
taxing authorities.
C.

Imagining the Public Trust in Data

What would this mean in practice? It is possible to imagine the implementation of various
public trust regimes that specifically accounted for and mitigated harms detailed in Part II. Without
being exhaustive, I sketch here one way in which a governance arrangement of this sort might be
deployed. I first explain why it would be wise to focus upon cities and states as the font of such
regulation. Next, I offer a sketch of how a public trust in data might work on the ground.
1.

Jurisdictional Choice for a Public Trust in Data

Subnational jurisdictions, and in particular cities, are the most promising starting point for
a public trust in data. A “majority of the world's population lives in cities,” a situation that “marks
a major and unprecedented transformation of the organization of society, both spatially and
geopolitically.”378 Cities are hence directly accountable to the vast agglomerations of individuals
now generating most locational, behavioral, and social data. Moreover, they tend to be
geographically compact. “Cities develop because they … provide residents with the advantages of
big, diverse, and productive markets and creative ferment.”379 Cities are also responsible for
addressing many, if not all, of the social harms spilling over from personal data economies.380
Hence it is no surprise that we have already seen that cities such as Barcelona, Amsterdam, New
York, and Washington experimenting with proto-trust forms and kindred regulatory strategies for
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platform economies and sensing nets. 381 The extraterritorial reach of such regulation poses no
barrier. In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional power of subnational
jurisdictions to impose sales taxes upon out-of-state retailors.382 The application of the public trust
doctrine by a locality to an extraterritorial platform would, equally, be permissible and present no
distinct constitutional difficulty related to extraterritorially.
As a practical matter, data subject to a public trust is likely to be stored in the cloud. This
might entail the use of a single storage location or a “shard” structure whereby a “single file can
be broken into components and stored in different countries, and intelligence embedded in the
network decides where to send and store the data.”383 A municipal public trust regime would not
necessarily require that data be held locally, as the proposed Indian law would.384 It would, though,
demand that where data falling within a public trust was stored elsewhere, it would continue to be
subject to that municipality’s regulation. A data storage regime that located data in a jurisdiction
with conflicting or inconsistent regulation would therefore be a violation of the public trust.
The choice of a subnational unit also ensures that a public trust can more precisely correct
distributive pathologies of the data economy. Such a trust can impose user fees on firms that wish
to exploit data, and then direct their proceeds to the populations producing the latter. At the national
level, there is a greater chance that such funds might be repurposed to other ends.
2.

Creating a Public Trust in Data
What would a public trust in data look like? Its establishment would have three basic steps.

To begin with, a state or local government would by legislation or ordinance establish a
public trust in the data created by its citizens within its geographical ambit. Unlike older public
trusts established through case-law, this one would be created and grounded in democratic
(legislative) deliberation and choice.385 Indeed, one of the advantages of a public trust structure is
the possibility of subjecting personal data aggregations to greater degrees of democratic control.
The legislation would begin with a declaration that title to the data resided in the public trust,
without regard to where the data was physically housed.
A jurisdiction would next have to decide on what data to include. A logical place to begin,
and the starting point for Barcelona’s Decidem platform,386 is the locational data created by public
and private sensing nets within the jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Decidem platform, for example,
the winner of a contract to supply a city-wide bike share system would “have to give the city back
all the information it collects about how citizens are using the service.”387
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Decidem is not the only initiative to focus on locational data. In 2018, Washington, DC
partnered with a not-for-profit called SharedStreets to give the municipality pickup and drop-off
data from Uber.388 This data is then used “to understand whether … drivers are too often blocking
traffic to pick up passengers” and even to “reconsider … street designs or traffic patterns to
accommodate the new ways of getting around.”389 A step toward the public trust form,
SharedStreets is a nonprofit rather than a legislative creation. Uber’s participation is, though,
voluntary rather than mandatory. Yet this is easy to change. A year later, indeed, New York City
mandated the disclosure of the same data by ride-sharing companies “to learn more about what’s
happening on the streets,” “to plan … how to beat traffic and improve road safety,” to “monitor
the number of wheelchair-accessible vehicles picking up passengers” and to “enforce its new
minimum wage rule for app-based drivers.”390 In other words, New York is using a public quasiownership strategy for data both as a means of creating public goods that would otherwise go
unrealized and also to prevent drivers’ exploitation. Nevertheless, the New York initiative is
limited to the extent that it does not give the municipality actual title to the data. That step would
not only allow for the creation of public goods, but the conditioning of firm access upon the
avoidance of harms documented in Part II.
There is no reason to limit the public trust to the obvious and intuitive example of locational
data. Rather, these applications might be stepping stones for more aggressive applications—to
other sensing net data and to locally acquired platform economy data. Indeed, the public trust for
data would not reach its full potential without these latter applications. Hence, a public trust could
be extended to all sensing-net devices within a jurisdiction. This might include, as a threshold
matter, all such devices operating in public spaces. It could also be extended to data from devices,
such as Alexa, that operate within domestic spaces. It could be applied to the data generated
through commercial transactions (such as Amazon) and through social network. Platforms would
continue to generate and store all this data—to be clear, there is no thought here of cities building
their own data-storage centers—but the way in which such data could be disseminated, exploited,
and monetized would be constrained by the public trust. The latter would, further, have a claim to
a portion of profits generated by the exploitation of user data that could be imposed in the form of
user fees.
There is a further question of whose data would fall within a trust. A city has a plausible
claim to data locally produced by a local resident through interactions on a platform economy.
When a resident of the municipality logs on from a local IP address, accessing a social network,
they are creating valuable data for aggregation and circulation. They are also risking the harms
listed in Part II. A city that asserts an interest in the data thereby created, and seeks to subject that
data to regulation through the vehicle of a public trust, is properly acting in its citizens’ interests.
It is a closer case whether the same is true for visitors’ data—but the difficulty of distinguishing
between residents and visitors might counsel for treating both as subject of the public trust.
Moreover, recall that platforms such as Facebook install cookies on users’ cellphones and
computers that capture both call data and also traffic to other web sites.391 This data, which does
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not directly serve users, is also generated by local activity and has commercial value. It too presents
sharp normative concerns about privacy and exploitation. Accordingly, a municipality has an
interest in this data too. Data subject to this public trust need not be stored locally, but (as
discussed) should be amenable to local control. The municipality should then subject the data to a
schedule of permitted and impermissible uses. These should be a matter for democratic
determination, albeit within the board limits imposed by the public trust’s fiduciary framing.
Overall, the goal would be to continue to allow commercial exploitation while constraining
externalities and structural harms.
Assume, then, that a trust over some class of data has been determined. The third and final
step in fashioning a public trust is the fashioning of bilateral obligations to constrain state and
private handling of data to promote broad public benefits rather than narrowly channelized private
profits. To this end, legislation would describe the terms and conditions for private exploitation of
the data, either directly or in combination with other databases. A schedule of permitted and
impermissible uses should be determined by democratic means, albeit within the board limits
imposed by the public trust’s fiduciary framing. Overall, the goal would be to continue to allow
commercial exploitation while constraining externalities and structural harms. Further, the trust
should establish rules to prevent misuse of the data by the state itself.
As a threshold matter, a municipal jurisdiction could require that information held in the
global cloud—whether sharded or localized—have a local “data trustee” with “the exclusive
ability to access the data” regardless of where physical storage occurred.392 This would mitigate
conflicts-of-law problem that might arise from the globalization of storage capacities. It would
also provide the city with a focal point for regulation and oversight. By fortunate coincidence, both
Facebook and Google have announced that they are moving legal responsibility for their data from
Dublin to California “as a consequence of Brexit.”393 This change lowers one barrier to the creation
of a public trust in data. The data trustee would be charged with the technical implementation of
trust rules: It would, to that effect, monitor both private and public uses of the data to guard against
misuse on either side. In the absence of a trustee, a government office (such as a state’s attorney
general could play this role).
The trusteeship element of the public trust distinguishes it from other feasible regulatory
interventions in private data economies. It thus brings into focus the ways in which the public trust
differs from other potential regulatory forms. A state or municipality in theory has the power to
impose limits on how data is collected or used already. But it lacks instruments of ongoing
supervision and management to ensure this a way to at downstream uses do not violate its rules. A
trustee fulfills that role using the enforcement related authorities discussed below. Further, most
existing regulatory strategies are aimed at controlling private malfeasance. In the context of data
economies, both public and private action presents a risk of harm. A trusteeship mechanism is a
way to achieve durable regulatory control over data as an asset. It is also a way to combine limits
on private with a constraint on improper state action. Finally, the public trust mechanism is a means
of bundling together—legislating in one fell swoop—an array of constraints on both private and
public action. It is far more likely that a defensible set of measures will be adopted if this bundled
approach is taken than if regulation is pursued piecemeal.
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More substantive obligations could then take either positive or negative forms. Consider
four ways in which the public trust doctrine could be crafted to mitigate harms. Again, I emphasize
that what follows is very much a sketch—with more details turning on the specifics of the kinds
of data subject to trust control, and the particulars of the jurisdiction.
First, the fact of state ownership of data constrains the private exploitation of informational
and market inequalities. States can condition access and use of personal data on rules that minimize
discrete privacy losses and acts of individual exploitation.394 A company such as Uber that gathers
and exploits individual locational data, for example, might be required to follow labor policies and
pricing strategies that did not merely maximize private profits.395 A company such as Facebook,
which “does not disclose information about its uses of data … at all” would at a minimum be
required to account for its commercial strategies before operating in a jurisdiction.396 A sensing
net that produced visual data that included faces might be restricted from allowing these to be used
as training data for controversial facial recognition instruments.
Second, private uses of personal data could be conditioned to agreement to share a fraction
of profits with the trust. In effect, use taxes would ensure that those create data benefit from its
transformation into an asset. Rather than paying individuals for data, a public trust is a way to
recoup some return from the emotional, intellectual, and even physical labor that allowed its
creation. The trust, in turn, would be legally obliged to apply those funds to the general benefit of
a city or state’s residents. Local labor hence becomes a fiscal foundation for local public goods.
Third, access to data for commercial use could be conditioned on an agreement to forego
certain harmful transformations. For example, a social media platform subject to the public trust
regiment might be required to demonstrate that its network architecture did not facilitate the
dissemination of false political information or deliberately polarizing propaganda.397 It might be
compelled to show that it did not, even inadvertently, present different interfaces to men and
women.398 It would have to demonstrate that its algorithm was designed not merely to maximize
engagement as such, but to elicit forms of social-media activity that are consistent with democratic
norms.
On this last score, it is worth underscoring that a public trust need not engage only in
constraint. Like the Silicon Valley Data Trust,399 it might also aim at the positive production of
needful public goods. Hence, a condition of access to personal data might be the generation of
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public goods that would otherwise be difficult to create. For example, a ride-sharing company or
a traffic app that generated locational data for vehicles might be allowed to operate only if could
certify that its recommendation apps minimized traffic and air pollution. An individual locational
service such as FourSquare might be allowed to operate only if it also committed to sharing data
with public health authorities to identify ‘hotspots’ during pandemics (or, indeed, flu season).400
A two-sided platform for consumers and merchants such as Amazon might be required to place
data on usage patterns into a trust, where it could be tapped by individuals looking to build new
platforms and products.401 A social network might commit to providing timely information on the
diffusion of anti-democratic messaging, such as the speech and mobilization that led to the January
6, 2021, Capitol siege. At present, there is “no financial or political incentive to look for the
evidence [of misinformation and conspiracies being spread].”402 By conditioning access to
personal data on a network’s willingness to diligently root out misinformation, the public trust
doctrine yields the beginning of a solution. The production of public goods may be part of the
quid-pro-quo reached with firms in allowing them access to personal data.
Finally, a public trust needs enforcement mechanisms to head off the risk of both private
abuse and interest-group capture of a state agency. This could be done through the creation or a
trustee, or by giving an official such as a state’s attorney general a durable oversight mandate. A
trustee, for example, should have the power to seek judicial intervention to enjoin impermissible
dissemination or use of public-trust data. It should be able to seek fines for past conduct, even
though the sheer scale of certain platforms makes this approach somewhat less than effective. In
extreme cases, a trustee might seek to permanently enjoin a firm from using or benefiting from
data under the trust. Under a regime of plural trusts established by different cities, these remedies
might be amplified by linking together penalties in serious cases. For example, if a breach of trust
rules is serious enough, this might be treated by law in different jurisdiction as a ground for
excluding a firm from data usage. By calibrating the ensuing ‘cascade’ of interjurisdictional
penalties in different ways, the trustee could dial up and down the severity of the ensuing
enforcement regime.
A trustee should also have power to intervene against improper state action. An obvious,
but overblown, objection to a public data trust is likely to flow from privacy concerns. The state,
of course, already has access to much personal data because it operates social security and tax
systems. It is far from clear that a public data trust, where the state itself held no information,
presents new or insurmountable privacy worries. In any event, a public trust can be designed to
stymie improper state action. From the beginning of the Republic, courts have enforced public
trust-limits against the state at the behest of individuals. Unconstrained by the rigors of Article III
standing doctrine, state courts have done so even when a plaintiff could not show some distinctive
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stake in an asset’s deployment.403 A basic enforcement mechanism would involve ex post review
of a license to use data, or a permission to acquire data within a jurisdiction, as consistent with the
public trust. Additionally, several state courts have developed a form of “hard look” of licenses
and alienations of a public-trust asset to guard against the risk of interest-group capture leading to
improper spoilage of a public-trust asset.404 For example, drawing on state environmental
regulation for a basic template, the California Supreme Court has required the state’s Water
Resources Control Board to look closely at how water diversions to Los Angeles impact nearby
Mono Lake, and to protect its public-trust uses “whenever feasible.”405 Like the trans-substantive
“hard look” doctrine of federal administrative law, this approach can be extended beyond its
original sphere of application. The ex post examination of the justifications for how public-trust
data is employed provides perhaps the most fine-grained instrument for evaluating the integrity of
public decision-making about these uses.
Finally, the effect of municipal public trust regulation of this sort, moreover, holds the
promise of catalyzing more extensive reforms. Imagine a city such as New York, Chicago, or Los
Angeles imposing constraints on the use of its residents’ personal data. These metropolises are so
large, and so globally important in the digital economy, that firms would have little choice but to
comply. In effect, a version of the “California effect” might take hold.406 To be sure, the creation
of municipal-level data-use regimes creates a possibility of regulatory conflict. But this already
exists given the variance in European and American regimes, and the growing possibility of statelevel interventions.407 To mitigate the risk of conflicting rules, cities could coordinate policy
approaches, as they have done recently in respect to global migration policies, to minimize
disruptive disuniformity.408 It seems likely that American cities will have similar democratic
preferences over many issues, and so would be able to coordinate in ways that conduced to a
generally harmonious regulatory environment.
*

*

*

In summary, the history of the public trust doctrine provides a deep repository of legal
duties and remedies for the management of common-pool assets. On the one hand, this means that
mere invocation of the term “public trust” does little analytic work on its own.409 But for a
jurisdiction wishing to exercise a richer measure of democratic control over personal data
economies, the doctrine can be a rich storeroom of ideas. I have outlined here one way of
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appropriating these doctrinal resources for the new information economy. My aim, however, has
not been to apply a definitive blueprint. It has rather been to demonstrate the plausibility, and
value, of the project.
Conclusion
New economies through which personal data is extracted, aggregated, and exchanged have
created great commercial gains and large windfalls in personal well-being. After the pandemic, no
one should need a reminder of the value of communicating by Facetime, WhatsUp, or similar apps.
Yet at the same time, these same economies have generated significant new challenges for
individuals and for societies at large.
The public trust in data provides another tool for addressing those concerns. It does so by
harnessing a form of public, collective property as old as the republic. That property form has done
yeoman’s service already in advancing environmental goals. My central ambition here has been to
demonstrate its utility in the new data economy context. Such eversion of doctrinal forms should
not be a complete surprise: The common law, as a shared legal heritage, is itself a kind of public
good—capable of being deployed to new and unexpected ends. A public trust in data is simply one
such possibility being realized.
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